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TRIBAL ADMINISTRATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
RUSSEL

L.

BARSH*

JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON"*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly resource-conscious economy, native American
communities confront promising opportunities and perplexing
choices. Large reserves of untapped fossil fuels, water, timber, and
fisheries remain in tribal jurisdiction.' Potentially even greater
supplies of water are currently exploited without effective tribal consent and may be restored to tribal control. 2 Productive exploitation of this share of contemporary market power will depend upon
an integrated program of economic and structural reorganization
consistent with individual tribal goals. That is an ambitious generality. We can only aspire to ,the setting forth of what we perceive
as the blueprint for quantitative and formal legal study.
II.

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TRIBAL RESOURCES

The strategic quality of tribal resources today is two-fold. A
changing world situation, combined with the inevitable depletion of
already-developed domestic supplies, is enhancing the price of what
many tribes appear to have most of: energy resources. Shortages
of potable water are of growing concern, and there is reason to believe that only recession has succeeded in reprieving the country
from wood-product shortages. Fish products, which are in neither
exceedingly high demand nor short supply at this time, could soon
prove increasingly valuable here (as they have abroad) as cheap,
low-energy substitutes for fertilizer and animal protein. The inefficient management policies of existing federal forestry programs
* J.D., 1974 Harvard University, Assistant Professor of Business, Government and
Society, University of Washington.
** J.D., 1974 Harvard University, Assistant Professor of Native American Studies, University of Calif., Berkley.
1.

See generally H.

HOUGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN RESOURCES

(1971).

AS Hough ob-

serves, adequate inventories of tribal resources simply do not exist, although many individual tribes have undertaken contract surveys. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has also
identified incomplete inventory as a problem. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES, printed in SuiOMMrrT
ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., ECONOMIO DEVELOPMENT
FOR NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, Vol. 2, at 358 (Joint Economic Committee Print

1969) [The Committee print is a compendium of papers submitted to the Subcommittee on
Economy and will hereinafter be referred to as 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT].
2. Veeder, Federal Encroachment on Indian Water Rights and the Impairment of Reser-

vation Development, printed in

1969 JOINT COMM. PRINr, vol.

liam Veeder's bibliography would
also HOUGH, supra note 1.

2, supra note 1, at 331. Wil-

suffice as testimony to the foregoing observation. See
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and state fisheries regulation are added reasons to anticipate successful competitive marketing by tribes.3 As a rule, wherever existing supplies are costly, either because of legal constraints or depletion, tribes with fresh reserves or an effective economic policy
can expect to have a significant competitive advantage.
On the other hand, owing to relatively low "human capital," dispersed demography, and isolation from utilities and established pathways of communication and transportation, tribes cannot expect easily to attract labor-intensive secondary industries.4 New industrial
centers could be established, but only at the monumental expense
of creating the market "infrastructure" from the ground up and
then attracting adequate non-Indian labor to operate industry on an
efficient scale. The ultimate demographic outcome could thoroughly
defeat the social goal of development; i.e., the advancement of the
existing Indian community.
Infrastructure costs are also prohibitive to private developers.
They are ordinarily financed by means of long-term public borrowing, usually on a pledge of public credit, and by taxation. Public
financing in turn requires a foundation of taxable property or other
substantial revenue for debt service or security, which few tribes
can now provide. Accordingly, tribes increasingly rely on federal
lending and grantsmanship. However, federal agencies are unwilling to underwrite the cost of overall industrialization, perferring instead to capitalize specific industrial projects at considerably lower cost.5 Without infrastructure development, federally-funded industry is substantially equivalent to social security. While it lasts,
some employment can be generated, but there is no real groundwork for future growth (except perhaps an increase in human capital through the training incidental to employment).
It may be that most reservations are not located for efficient
secondary industrialization. It may also be that tribes must simply
find sources of starting capital other than federal agencies. Under
either view the significance of primary industry is clear, both as a
3. Crutchfield, Economic Objectives of Fishery Management, in THE FISHERIES, PROBLEMS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Crutchfield ed. 1965) ; J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PUNTECORVO,

THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES (1969). Dis-economical over-conservation of resources was
attributed to the federal timber management program operated on public lands and tribal
lands by Samuelson, Hirschliefer, et al. at a conference held November 23, 1974, by the
College of Forest Resources, University of Washington. Publication of the papers is forthcoming.
4.

E.g.,

BUREAU

OF INDIAN

AFFAIRS,

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

OF INDIAN

COMMUNITIES,

printed in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, vol. 2, supra note 1, at 356-7. These features are not
unique to Indian communities, but also frequently characterize non-Indian communities on
and near reservations. This fact exacerbates tribe-state relations through competition for
federal subsidy, as for example in the revenue-sharing program.
5. Bureau records indicate that the agency has actually provided a very small share of
industrialization and project funds in the past, the major portion having been provided by
private lenders or from tribal revenues. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FOR NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, 'printed in 1969 JonT COMM. PRINT, vol. 2, aupra note
1, at 349.
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source of continuing income and as an initial source of capital for
industrialization. 6
III. LEADERSHIP-DEFICIT THINKING

Any consideration of federal Indian policy leads to the inescapable conclusion that it was intended to depopulate the reservations
rather than facilitate tribal growth. Official claims notwithstanding,

little progress has been made in tribal growth because the underlying theory of reservation underdevelopment is the same now as it
was a century ago.
Six years ago the Bureau of Indian Affairs appraised its traditional policy as "essentially nondevelopmental" and promised to
move with all dispatch from a "custodial" role of preservation, to
a "stewardship" policy of prudent investment and growth. 7 The
suggested dichotomy is fundamentally misleading. The Bureau has
been actively exploiting tribal resources since the turn of the century, and since 1920 has been authorized to deduct a "reasonable
fee" from the proceeds to pay for its own administration. s Even
before that time, the Congress had been accustomed to liquidating
tribal resources for the benefit of non-Indians, as for example in
the construction of railroads 0 and through sale to private develop-

ers.1
It is tempting to identify in the history of federal Indian policy
a "savings account" theory of management. Reservation building
has always been most intensive during periods of an abundance of
land. Following the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, Indian territories
were reserved in the great vastnesses of the west, well beyond the
pale of contemporary development. However, when these reserved
lands became valuable for their minerals, rights-of-way, or agriculture, the United States rapidly liquidated them by removal, 12 emi6. We have avoided classifying "agribusiness" as a primary industry only because it
does not yet share the strategic significance of fuels, water, timber, and fisheries: prices
are notoriously low and reservations offer no particular competitive advantages. However,
It cannot be disregarded as an alternative because labor requirements are relatively low
and the basic resource-arable and pasturable surface-is abundantly available.
7. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES, printed
in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, VOL. 2, supra note 1, at 336.
8. Act of February 14, 1920, ch. 75, § 1, 41 Stat. 408, 415. This extends to any lease
of tribal or alloted land. The Bureau originally interpreted this to entitle it to 8% of gross
receipts where continuing supervision was provided, and 3% where there was an outright
sale. In 1944, 25 C.F.R. § 61.25 (now 25 C.F.R. § 141.18 (1975)) was amended to allow a
10% and 5% fee respectively. Some quantification of trends in leasing is found In HOUGH,
supra note 1, at 117-30, 143-44.'
9. E.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscavova Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (hydroelectric darn) ; United States v. Creek Nation, 305 U.S. 479 (1938) (national forest).
10. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) ; Buttz v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 114 U.S. 55 (1886).
11. Tuttle v. Moore, 64 S.W. 585 (Ct. App. Indian Terr. 1901).
12. E.g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942) (findings of
fact). The justification for removing the Sioux from their Black Hills reservation, i.e., that
the United States could not protect them from its own citizens' desire to exploit Sioux
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nent domain,3 and allotment. 1 4 The General Allotment Act 15 was
not undone, significantly, until the Depression. While land prices
were low, the Bureau reacquired former reservation lands, simultaneously compensating non-Indian victims of the economic disaster
and beginning a new cycle of federal management. 6 During the
Korean War boom of the early 1950's, the policy of tribal dissolution
and transfer of Indian lands to private development was reasserted.
This trend significantly reversed only over the past few years. 1
In general, the long-run economic cycles of American boom and
bust have been the cycles of reservation "deposits" and "withdrawals" by the federal "trustee."
The Republic originally relied exclusively upon customs and the
sale of public lands for revenue, as had the colonies before the Revolution., This reliance shaped the conflict between the federal government and the states over Indian jurisdiction more than any tenderness of regard for the Indians. By retaining exclusive jurisdiction over tribal territory, the United States "banked" future revenue. 19 More recently, liquidation of tribal holdings has served as
an incentive to the states for accepting the transfer to them of the
welfare burden of Indians, who the Congress originally believed with
scientific conviction would by now have conveniently disappeared. 20
resources, is an echo of the arguments made to the Cherokees on the eve of their removal
from Georgia and Tennessee. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, INDIAN AFFAIRS 467-77. In the
Cherokee case, removal yielded lands already improved by tillage and fencing, and the
construction of turnpikes, bridges, and ferries by the Nation.
13. Buttz v. Northern Pac. Ry., 119 U.S. 55 (1866).
14. See generally D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS
(1972); M. YOUNG, REDSKINS, RU'FLESHIRT AND REDNECKS (1961) (discusses Creek allotments during the first removal period).
15. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 838.
16. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-465 (1970). These laws were introduced in 1933, the year in which
U.S. land prices hit their lowest point between 1906 and the present, and at the end of a
plunge that had begun in 1920. From 1920-1933, the national average price for farmland
fell from $69 to $30 per acre. The years 1925-1927 were also the poorest homestead entry
years since homesteading began. U.S. CENSUS,

STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

236-37, 278 (1960).
17. This of course refers to the legislation, principally Pub. L. No. 83-280 (Act of Aug. 15,
1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588), which followed the declaration of policy in I.R. CON. RES.
83, enacted Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B192. Pub. L. No. 83-280 was later amended to require
tribal consent. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1821-26).
18. Until 1845, land sales comprised at least 10% of the federal reserve. U.S. CENSUS,
STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 712-13. In

this regard it

is amusing to reflect

on Anthony Trollope's astonishment at America's abhorrance of taxation as an alternate
form of revenue. A. TROLLOPE, NORTH AMERICA (1862).
19. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), held that citizens could acquire
fee land only by patent, not through Indian grantors. See aMo Chief Justice Marshall's
concluding remarks In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1910) (dictum). The
states contended that the McIntosh principle imposed a duty on the United States to extinguish Indian claims. State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256 (1835); State v. Tassels, 1 Ga.
Rep. Ann. (1 Dud.) 478 (1830).
Even recently, the Supreme Court has acceded to this view, distinguishing the property rights of tribal Indians and tribal Filipinos (during American trusteeship) on the
basis that the purpose of the Philippine occupation was "for the benefit of the inhabitants,"
whereas the purpose for regulating Indians was to acquire territory. Carino v. Insular
Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449, 458 (1908), cited with approval in Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 384 U.S. 272, 284 n.18 (1955).
20. "The speedy extinction of the race seems rather to be hoped for than regretted, and
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Cycles in the demand for Indian resources have also been reflected in the changing legal status of tribal government. No assertion of a federal power to supervise the domestic affairs of Indians
was made until liquidation of reservations was undertaken in the
1880's.21 Many early supervised tribal governments, such as those
of the Osage and Navajo, were created expressly for the purpose
of ratifying mineral leases. 22 The Indian Reorganization Act,2"
which provides authority for reacquisition of reservation land, also
provides a general grant of governmental powers to Indian tribes,
including power to control mineral leasing, but in practice tribes
are generally afforded only the opportunity to veto Bureau leasing
plans.2 4 In specific cases this flows from statutory delegations of
review power to the Interior Department. 25 In addition, most Indian Reorganization Act tribal constitutions, drafted by the Interior
Department, contain express delegations of review powers to the
28
Secretary of the Interior.
"Leadershipm-deficit thinking" describes a theory of policy that
justifies federal administration of tribal resources and simultaneously seeks to excuse the United States from responsibility for continuing Indian poverty. It is characterized by two axiomatic assertions about Indians: (1) they are anti-developmental and ignorant,
2 7
and (2) these failings are the result of their cultural differentness.
they look forward to it themselves with a sort of indifference." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS, EXEC. Doc. No. 1 33rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1854). "To exterminate the
aborigines of forest and the mountains is a policy that no enlightened citizen or statesman
will propose or advocate. That this race . . . are destined to a speedy and final extinction,
according to the laws now in force, either civil or divine, or both, seems to admit of no
doubt, and Is equally beyond the control or management of any human agency. All that
can be expected from an enlightened and Christian government, such as ours is, Is to
graduate and smooth the pass-way of their final exit from the saga of human existence."
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 181 (1854).
21. See generally W. HAGEN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGEs (1966).
22. See, e.g., Shepardson, Navajo Ways in Government, A Study in Political Process,
65 AMER. ANTHROPOLOGIST pt. 2, at 3 (1963).

23. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
24. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). M3LAN'E, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON INDIAN LAINDS (1955)
Is illustrative and written from the perspective of the lessee.
25. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403a (1970).
26. See, Fay Charters, Constitutions and By-Laws of Indian Tribes of North America,
Colorado State College Museum of Anthropology, Occasional Papers In Anthropology Nos.
1-16 (1967-1972).
27. According to the Bureau, traditional Indian culture suppressed acquisitiveness, competition, and technology; it was marked by a "reverent disposition toward habitat." Material wealth was not important and the "promise of payrolls . . . often does not provide
the motivation needed to encourage economic growth." Sharing (the Indian "social security
program") discouraged earnings. Time was devoted primarily to "contemplation." BUREAU
OF INDAN

AFFAIRS,

EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT

OF INDIAN

COMMUNITIES,

printed

in

1969

JOINT

COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 332-34, 337, 342-44. These are outrageous generalizations. Even if they described Indian communities in 1900, that is no reason to expect
them to be equally true today. The very fact that Indians are demanding development assistance and complaining about Bureau "stewardship" of their resources is the clearest
disproof of these assertions. To fend off Indian developmentalism, the Bureau (and environmental groups) have exploited this "grandfather" argument to convince tribes that
real Indians do not develop their resources; they have others do It for them. See Barsh,
Corporations and Indians: Who's the VillianF M.B.A. 11-13 (June 1975). The Blue Lake
Amendment hearings are particularly Illustrative of conditioning tribal land ownership upon
non-development. Hearings on S. 750 and H.R. 471 Before the Subcommittee on Indian Af-
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To be :sure, the Bureau has been the first to admit that there
are other obstacles to development, such as a lack of infrastructure,
inadequate capital markets, and legal constraints. Nevertheless, emphasis in principal and practice has been directed towards the development of human capital. 28 This has the advantage of being the
cheapest obstacle to overcome, but it is not necessarily conducive
to tribal growth. Skilled labor tends to migrate to places where there
is employment; therefore, a disproportionate emphasis on training
results in depopulating the community. The Bureau has persuaded
itself that "no prospective improvement in the management of resources or employment of Indians in resource use can yield the
equivalent of the absorption of the ideal reservation labor force
. . . through such employment at standard wage rates," implying
that emigration is unavoidable and reservation poverty inevitable.2 9
The "relocation" program, recently phased out in favor of less overtly coercive programs, from 1952 to 1968 offered employment assistance and special subsidies only to Indians who agreed to migrate
to the nation's cities.
It can of course be argued that improving human capital will
serve as an attraction to existing industries to relocate on reservations.30 In the absence of infrastructure development, however, an
industry will relocate on reservations only if the available labor
force is willing to work at wages low enough to offset the costs resulting from reservation isolation.2 1 This cannot be the Bureau's
fairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 127
(1970). There is also a cause-and-effect issue. To the extent that anti-development values
have arisen or persisted, they may be the result of dependence, economic failure, and the
repetition of anti-economic ideology by the Bureau, rather than the cause of poverty.
Moreover, we believe that the Bureau mistakes a legitmate tribal policy objective of distributive equity for primitive irrationality, described in greater detail In the fifth part of
this essay. See also L. GILBREATH, RED CAPITALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAJO ECONOMY

(1973).
28. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES, printed
in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 986-37, 341, 353, 354; ECONOMIc DE-

VELOPMENT

ADMINISTRATION,

DEPARTMENT

OF

COMMERCE,

INDIAN

DEVELOPMENT

PRO-

GRAM, printed in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra, note 1, at 358-59. An examination
of the budgets of the United States for these years indicates that, since these comments
were made, Bureau expenditures for education have been at least ten times greater than
for credit and business development. The Bureau's business development program itself is
primarily devoted to on-the-job training.
29. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES, printed
in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, Pt. 2, supra note 1, at 341. Resource development may not be
the final solution, but can be a stage in the growth of a diversified economy. There is a
conspicuous absence of relevance to resource potential in the Bureau statement quoted
from here, as also in the statements of coordinate funding agencies. E.g., ECONOMIC DE-

VELOPMENT

ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT

OF

COMMERCE,

INDIAN

DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM,

printed in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, Pt. 2, supra note 1, at 356. According to HoUGH,
supra note 1, at 11-12, 117-19, 143-44, however, agricultural and resource income have
greatly exceeded business income. Mineral proceeds averaged a little over $51 million per
annum, and timber proceeds $11 million per annum, in the decade ending 1966.
30.

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES, printed

in 1969 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. PRnr, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 348-49. Indians are led into
this trap by the argument that they excel in precision work, and therefore will attract
precision industries. HOUGH, Supra note 1, at 194-95, 199-200.
31. See, e.g., HOUGH, supra note 1, at 195. Wages, of course, vary from place to place
depending upon the costs of business and availability of labor. Lower-than-average wages
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objective, unless it believes that sound wages are not as important
as the experience of working. The leadership-deficit model suggests
that the reservation continues to be a "school of civilization" in
which Indians learn by doing, and then leave for more hospitable
82

environs.

This helps explain another curious practice: a disproportionate
emphasis in reservation development planning on small, secondary,
and tertiary industries, rather than comprehensive resource exploitation projects. 3 These small enterprises are likely to fail in the absence of industrialization or some outside source of consumer income.8 4 However, organizational demands are low for these enterprises, consistent with leadership deficit thinking that Indians are
incapable of advanced management. It is also cheaper to subsidize
a large number of small, low-capital enterprises, than to fund a few
costly major industries, and it makes it appear that more is being
done. As by-products, Indians are diverted from wresting control
of their natural resources from the United States and are trained
for relocation in the cities. Finally, the Bureau is assured of a continuing role as educator, planner, and supervisor. Successful industry would make tribes economically self-sufficient and therefore
eliminate the "need" for the continued existence of the Bureau.
The principle beneficiaries of a program of reservation subsidization that falls short of meeting infrastructure costs and establishing lasting industries are neighboring non-Indian communities.
as such are not necessarily a danger signal. If, as the Bureau contends, tribal citizens
value leisure time or reject materialism to an unusual degree. We can predict that they will
each work fewer hours, their wages will be somewhat lower, and more of them will be able
to work some hours. That is a rational economic choice. No one works day and night. All
of us value both leisure and wealth and seek to strive for the best mix of both. Our concern here Is, however, that for every dollar spent on training a dollar may not be spent
on attracting business to the reservaton-or financing Indian enterprises-in order to create
Jobs.
32. The mataphor is attributable to United States v. Clapor, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888).
where the court described tribal courts as "mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities" and the reservation itself as being "in the nature of a school, and the Indians are
gathered there . . . for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which
distinguished the civilized from the uncivilized man." This was a policy as well as a metaphor. HACEN, supra note 21. It is echoed in the contemporary argument that starting Indians .in small businesses is Justified as educational even if they fail economically. BUREAU
OP IN)iAN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN COMMUNITIEs,

printed in 1969 JOINT

COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 355.
38. Of the nearly $9 million in E.O.A. grants and loans reviewed by HOUGH, anpra note
1. at 263-65, about $5.5 million has been devoted to secondary tribal and private reservation industries, and less than $1 million to primary industries. In 1969 E.D.A. reported
having loaned or guaranteed approximately $13 million to non-Indian secondary industries
as an incentive to relocate on reservations. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INDIAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, printed in 1969 JOINT PRINT, pt.

2, supra note 1, at 360. The Small Business Administration operates under legal limitations
which lend it an unavoidable bias towards secondary and tertiary enterprises. ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN

THE AMERICAN INDIANe

COMMUNITY:

ROLE OF THE

SMALL B3USIESS

AD-

MINISTRATION, printed in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, Bupra note 1, at 398.
34. This is the fundamental error in Gilbreath's analysis of the Navajo economy. Gilbreath, supra note 27. He recommends retail and service industry promotion because of
low capital costs and minimal management requirements. HIowever, his own data indicate
that the Navajo consumer economy cannot now support such businesses because of characteristic low, fluctuating incomes.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

A large part of the development funds for tribes seems to be spent
on the professional time of planners, architects, and on construction. These services must be purchased from established, typically
non-Indian enterprises in surrounding communities. On-the-job training programs reduce the contribution of these non-Indian businesses to their Indian employees' wages.3 5 Consequently, the subsidy is
dispersed into the support of non-Indian business, and is inadequate
to foster any serious threat of future Indian competition.
IV.

TRUST RESPONSIBILITY IN THE BALANCE

Efforts to transfer Bureau regulatory functions to the tribes
meet with the argument that such a transfer will be used to justify
cessation of federal financial responsibilities to tribal communities.
The use of Public Law 83-280 to terminate supervision and assistance simultaneously is still remembered. In principle, equating
these two federal functions is unjustified. Although the federal government can constitutionally set conditions on the disposition of its
subsidies to sub-federal governing bodies, those conditions cannot
traverse the doctrine of limited powers to direct and control non-subsidized local activities." Accordingly, it is appropriate to observe
that the federal responsibility to subsidize tribes is the result of
treaties, whereas federal supervision rests largely upon subsequent
federal arrogations of power without treaty authority or revocable
tribal consent and delegation. Tribes can withdraw their consent 7 to
supervision without impairing their prior legal right to services.
Even supposing, however, that there is a substantial risk of simultaneous termination of supervision and assistance, it is not at
all clear that tribes would be worse off without the Bureau. Indeed,
35. See CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, INDIAI BUSINEss DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; HOUGH, supra note 1, at 192-93. Another example of this is federal assistance to
tribes for meeting basic needs. Indians may accept lower wages because they receive such
services. Federal services to Indians may therefore be passed on as reduced costs to nonIndian business.
36. Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
37. The federal trust responsibility has been characterized by the courts as a function of
[F]or their political
the tribes' dependence on the United States, "for their daily food ....
rights. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness. . .. ." United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886). Thus the argument could be made that tribal emergence into full
political self-regulation demonstrates an end of the condition of helplessness and therefore
an end to trusteeship. The flaw in that reasoning is that the treaty provisions in themselves are not addressed to helplessness, but speak in terms of a perpetual relationship,
typically arising out of a right to compensation for land rather than a privilege of pity.
Moreover, the guardian-ward metaphor relied upon so heavily by the courts following
Kagama originated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 80 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831), but was
there clearly intended to refer to political dependency in the international sense, not economic dependency. Chief Justice Marshall was careful to retreat there, and again in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), that federal authority ended at tribal borders. C.f. United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876). Subsidy without
domestic assistance was typical until the 1880's, when the courts reinterpreted federal
powers. Roft v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1897) ; In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 577-78
(1891).
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the proper question is, or should be, whether the benefits of trusteeship outweigh its diseconomies.
The Bureau is of course a conduit for all direct subsidies. But
even without the Bureau, tribes would continue to be eligible for general local government assistance, e.g., O.E.O., E.D.A., L.E.A.A.,
H.U.D. and revenue-sharing funds. In fact, the burden of providing
tribal subsidies has increasingly shifted away from the Bureau to
these conventional sources, 3 without a corresponding decrease in
Bureau supervision. Consequently, elimination of Bureau brokerage
functions would principally tend to reduce the added transaction
costs borne by Indians in dealing with government agencies. These
costs are the result, at least in part, of double review, delay, and
conflicting jurisdiction. They reduce the quantity of funds ultimately
available for distribution. To the extent that there continue to be
subsidy programs unique to Indians, such as general assistance and
revolving credit, it should be observed that most of them are selfreplenishing loan programs that require and receive little fresh capital from Congress.
Since the Bureau can disapprove any tribal resource development contract for no reason or any reason at all, it can choose among
bidders for tribal resources for reasons other than bids offered.3 9
The Bureau has no incentive to maximize tribes' profits, and is
therefore especially susceptible to the persuasion, pressure, and influence of bidders. Firms aspiring to develop tribal resources will
consequently devote more resources to "capturing" the agency's
discretionary approval, than to offering the tribe a competitive price.
Once a firm has won the support of the Bureau, pressure may be
brought to bear on tribal leaders not to exercise their own powers
of negotiation and approval. After all, if the Bureau is prepared to
back a particular firm, it is futile for the tribe to refuse to execute
a contract. It will simply mean that the resource remains undeveloped, and the tribe loses income.
The costs of "capturing" the Bureau will be reflected in a lower
price paid to the tribe. The successful firm obtains a monopoly on
approval of development contracts. It can also use its monopoly
position to limit the number of reservation jobs, thereby depressing
38. See generally HouGH, supra note 1. Compare also the respective statements of the
B.I.A., E.D.A., O.E.O., and S.B.A. in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, supra note 1.
39. E.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 131.5, 131.8 (1975) with regard to general surface leasing. This
power has been justified on the authority of 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9, 341-415 (1970). However,
tribes never consented to these laws by their treaties or otherwise. In 1934, Congress authorized tribes to adopt constitutions subject to Bureau approval. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
Despite assurances to Congress that this approval power would not be wielded to exact
routine supervisory powers from tribes, delegations of review power typically found in
I.R.A. constitutions. Hearings on the Readjustment of Indian Affairs before the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 107 (1934). See also United States
v. Boyd, 83 F. 537 (C.C.N.C. 1893) (expansively construing the effect of 25 U.S.C. § 81
(1920)).
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Indians' wages, or to charge monopoly prices to reservation consumers. 40 Tribes therefore pay dearly for the Bureau's brokerage
41
functions.
Even when it is not influenced by private interests, the Bureau
often makes inefficient choices. Until 1966, for example, tribal trust
funds were invested at 4 percent in safe Treasury bonds and government-sponsored railroad bonds.4 2 Federal authority to control such
investments is justified by the axiom of Indian ignorance, yet federal investment was dramatically risk-averse and seemingly reflective of a fear or ignorance of diversification. 43 It was not justifiable as a policy of protecting tribal funds, because it is in the tribe's
interest that its broker (the agency) seek to maximize the rate of
return, and, as in private brokerage, be liable in damages for its
negligence or incompetence. The express purpose of trusteeship is
to take the risk of loss off of the Indians and leave it in more enlightened hands. However, the Bureau's trust fund investment policy can
best be understood as intended primarily to minimize the government's risk of liability for loss to the tribal beneficiaries. Tribes
paid for the government's self-insurance by enjoying a lower rate
of return. Moreover, trust funds were manipulated into investments
that served (in principle) national, rather than tribal interests, at
rates well below those ordinarily necessary to attract private capital. In this way tribes were actually taxed for the benefit of the na.
tional treasury, to the extent of the difference between their four
percent and prevailing sound investment rates.
Because it is a matter of dollars, trust fund mismanagement
is readily quantified. There are at present no quantitative studies
evaluating risk-aversion in industrial development programs. However, the mere fact that the power to use and dispose of tribal resources ultimately rests with the Bureau indicates an inevitable diseconomy, whether or not the agency is "captured" by private in40.

FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION,

THE

TRADING

POST SYSTEM IN

TiE NAVAJO

RESERVATION

(Los Angeles Regional Office 1973).
41.

A substantial nortion of the Bureau's budget Is absorbed In administration and never

reaches tribes. In

1969, the Bureau spent one dollar to produce sixty cents of Indian in-

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INDIAN DE1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 360; A.
VELOPMENT PROGRAM, printed in
The Bureau doesn't charge tribes
SORKIN, AMER CAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID (1971).
come.

ECONOMIC

for its management functions directly, but that does not mean that this "assistance" is
free. A fee is deducted from all trust proceeds. See note 8 supra. The Bureau competed
with tribes for federal dollars in its annual budgets, and its mistakes reduce tribal wealth.
An investment decision by an incompetent Bureau staffer can cost more to a tribe than
the most expensive investment counselor's fee. The Bureau says Indians are untrained for
business, but its own supervisory staff rarely have any business expertise. They learn by

trial and error with the tribe's resources.
42. Sorkin, Indian Trust Funds, printed in 1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 8, supra note 1,
at 449.
43. Another example of risk-averse Bureau investment policy is its encouragement of
low-capital, low-risk, and low (or zero) return recreational development. See Clement, How
to Go Broke in the Tourist Business, First Indian Tourism Seminar (Univ. of Neb., July
11-13, 1973).
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terests. Administrative decisionmakers have no direct stake in
the outcome, unless mismanagement crosses some threshhold point
at which it becomes notorious and politically embarassing, or hurts
the agency itself. Then, and only then, will bureaucrats' job security
be on the line. 4 The cost-saving incentive operates to encourage a
more efficient use of funds within the agency rather than to encourage a more efficient distribution of funds. Superiors will want to minimize internal non-wage costs and maximize the costs of the services
provided, because that combination will- attract even more funds from
Congress.
Like most other agencies, the Bureau can maintain and even
enlarge its staff and budget by allowing its "problem" to persist.
Success is suicidal for the Bureau because its "problem," unlike,
say, the SEC's, is in theory supposed to go away completely some
day. It is thus in its own best interest to continue gracefully to fail.
Moreover, the Bureau is established within a department generally responsive to private land development interests. In the same
way that non-Indian lobbies mobilize to "capture" the Bureau, sister agencies mobilize to "capture" the Secretary of the Interior.
Development choices are ultimately made by the Secretary and
therefore reflect the influence of all of the agencies accountable to
him. It is small wonder that as much as ten percent of all tribal
territory disposed of since 1886 has been set aside as national parkland, when the National Park Service shares equal rank with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 4 5 The transfer of the Indian office from
the War Department to the Department of Interior (in 1849) suggests a purpose of subjugation and territorial exploitation, as opposed to trusteeship.
The Bureau has also been responsive to pressures from other
departments to protect the United States from liability to Indians
for its takings of their land. 4 6 Under these circumstances it is im44. Here we take issue with Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL JOUR. OF
ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 335 (1974). He appears to believe that advancement incentives are as strong for agency employees as wage incentives for private industrial employees. However, advancement In an ageny is predetermined by law with the highest
rung fixed; wages and salaries are open-ended. Posner's suggestion that agency employment is manipulated as a springboard for private business or professional employment
does not explain why bureaucrats would engage in cost-saving (how would private employers know about it?) nor does it seem to describe the life cycle of Bureau employees
in our experience.
45. HOUGH, supra note 1, at 31.
46. Chambers, Discharge of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Enforce L6gal Claims of
Indian Tribes; Case Studies of Bureaucratic Conflict of Interest, printed in SuBcoMMITE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
91ST CONG., 2D SEss., STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROTECTION

RESOURCES (1970). A particularly distressing example of this kind of
conflict was the Bureau's insistence that Congress reduce its appropriations for compensating the claimant in 1925. H.R. REP. No. 1466, 68 Cong., 2d Sess. (1925).
Also indicative of the conflicts in this area is the following remark made by a
spokesman for the solicitor's office: "We generally do not like to be in the position of
providing counsel for Indians against the United States, because, after all, we take an oath
OF INDIAN NATURAL
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possible to see how trusteeship as presently constituted can be lawful. It is not disputed that agencies typically respond to conflicting
pressures and that this is inherent to the political decision-making
process.4 7 However, the Bureau is unique in that it is both the agency
and, by operation of law, the representative or lobby for one of the
parties. This presents a curious twist on the familiar "appearance
of fairness" principle of administrative due process. At first blush
it would appear that non-Indian interests have more to complain
about than Indians. But this would be true only if the Bureau's de48
cision-makers had a real interest in being biased in favor of tribes.
agencies within the
The Bureau's need to get along with its 'sister
49
contrary.
the
suggests
Interior Department
Trusteeship makes good economic sense only where the
goals of the beneficiary are undisputed, and the beneficiary
lacks the trustee's ability for finding suitable means to reach those
goals. Like agency, trusteeship should be a voluntary arrangement,
in which the beneficiary gains from the expertise of the trustee.
At common law, involuntary commitment to the care of a guardian
or committee required a finding that the protected person did not
50
know the difference between profit and loss. That is to say, his
goa-s were patently irrational. If contractual capacity were to turn
on how clever we were at predicting the market, we should all be
in trusteeship. All investors experience loss to a greater or lesser
5 1
extent.
The subjectivity of value is an essential tenet of capitalism. A
free market economy cannot be said to maximize aggregate satisto uphold the laws of the United States and not to represent adverse interests." Hearings
on the ConstitutionalRights of American Indians, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 44-45 (1965).
47. E.g., American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), in which the Chairman of the Commission was disqualified on the basis of his prior legislative experience
with the facts pending decision.
48. The rule of necessity might be applicable to the Bureau to justify partiality towards
tribes, as a panel of experts no more partial than the execution of the law requires. FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948).
49. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1965), in which several members of the Commission who had been interrogated by a congressional committee pending
the decision were disqualified. At Roman and common law, the guardian could have no inheritance in the estate of the ward, como agnum committere lupo ("lest the lamb be committed to the wolf's care"). W. BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES* 462. By that test, federal
trusteeship would be fatally defective, because the United States is in effect the tribes'
reversloner: under the rule of Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), tribal
lands under cession become the property of the United States.
50. See, e.g., BRYDALL, NON CoMPos MsENTs 1-2, 6-9 (1700). It may be appropriate here
to clarify the difference between a "trustee," who has the legal title to a corpus of property, and a "guardian," who also has control over the person. Whatever it prefers to call
itself, the government has consistently acted in the manner of a guardian. W. BLACKSTONE,
1 COMMENTARIES* 460.

51. In this regard Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Thomas Edison would
probably be amused by the conviction inherent in our Indian policy that business acumen
is the product of polite education. It was Edison who remarked, upon the collapse of one
of his monumental failures, "Well, it's all gone, but we had a hell of a good time spending
It." M. JOSEPHSON, EDIsON 379 (1963). It Is probably accurate that the mentally retarded
are as a class more aut Juri8 and exercise greater political rights than Indians. The Issue
cannot reasonably be held out as competence.
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faction except as a summing up of all its members' individual idiosyncratic satisfactions. Differences in preference are to be expected,
and any policy that denies their legitimacy misallocates the resources of the community. The state can only interfere to the extent
52
that individual preferences pose dangers to others.
If the Bureau's role is described as that of an expert financial
counselor, it ought to be explained how it is that tribes can not obtain equal or surpassing expertise by voluntary arrangements with
professionals. If tribes are too irrational as a whole to choose their
agents, then they must also have been unable effectively to cede all
of their liberties forever to the United States. If they are too irrational to know what they really want, it should be demonstrated that
the Bureau detects their true needs with more precision. If they are
not demonstrably less rational than the rest of us, then federal trusteeship can have no legitimate basis.
The repeated economic failure of tribes, which bolsters an appearance of irrationality and fosters the justification for trusteeship,
can be explained as the product of at least four related economic factors beyond the control of tribes and attributable to federal policy.

A.

A SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

In addition to the expenses and inefficiencies attributable to
bad Bureau management, tribes bear an uncertainty cost for the
existence of the Bureau even when it chooses merely to passively
review tribal action. 53 The fact that the Bureau's prerogative is exercised in a particular case as a veto of tribal action is unimportant.
The veto power of the Bureau merely gives tribes an opportunity
to make for themselves those decisions the agency considers correct. As long as tribal and private business negotiators are aware
that the final decision will be made by a third party, they will have
little incentive to bargain freely. Both will respond to what they perceive to be acceptable to the reviewer. The Indians' situation is analogous to that of stockholders in a large corporation. In law and
principle they are the true owners, but their effective power is so
diluted by the mechanics of decision-making that they tend not to
exercise what power they have. In addition, the price paid to the
tribe will be reduced by the costs, especially delay costs, of comply52. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ; People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1969), rev'g 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1967), and foZlow ng People
V. Havnor, 149 N.Y 197 (1896); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
58. In 1969 the Bureau characterized itself as "Increasingly supportive rather than directive," although its programs did not yet reflect full practical recognition of this change.
BUREAU

OF INDIAN

AFFAIRS,

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN

COMMUNITIES,

printed in

1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, Pt. 2, &upranote 1, at 331. Most day-to-day management of resources, however, continued to be conducted by the Bureau. HOUGH, 8upra note 1, at 21-22,

155.
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ing with Bureau review procedures after and in addition to the actual contract negotiations.5
B.

FRAGMENTARY OWNERSHIP

Even when an independent tribal decision can be made, it must
contend with the fragmentation of ownership of resources left in the
wake of the allotment policy. By statute, 55 lands still tribal, allotted,
tracts, and fee simple tracts are subject to different terms and conditions of resource leasing, taxation, and development. Checkerboarding of reservations results in high transaction costs of orchestrating
different classes of ownership all pertaining to, say, the same
stream or coal seam. This is complicated by a number of jurisdictional concessions made to the states by the allotment acts, such
that either tribal or state laws, in addition to federal regulations,
may control any one tract.5 Integrated development requires that
the tribe buy back diverse individual interests granted away in the
past by the Bureau, some of which it probably cannot condemn,
and at the risk of free-rider problems. Many tribes have begun comprehensive purchase-leaseback programs to prospectively consolidate their territorial jurisdiction and ownership for development
5

purposes.

7

Allotment also introduced a parallel system of inheritance, independent of the tribal courts. In order to appear to be scrupulously
aloof, the Bureau has taken notice of nothing but degree of blood or
kinship. Accordingly, undivided fractional shares accumulate as reservation population grows, and the acreage represented by each
share shrinks proportionately. In 1965 the N.C.A.I. reported that 48
percent of the allotments in a sample of twelve reservations- had six
or more owners of undivided interests, 29 percent had more than
ten owners with such interests, and 14 percent had more than
twenty. Average allotment size was 240 acres.5 8 Once again, trans54. These additional costs of transactions with tribes also reduce the quality of the
technical assistance they receive. Consultants depend upon minimizing their costs to make
a profit from their fee or percentage. Consultants for tribes face generally higher costs,
because of duplicate negotiations and the requirement of Bureau supervision and final approval of their work. Hence, for the same percentage, a consultant will prefer to work for
anyone but a tribe, if he can. Tribes must pay more, or accept poorer quality work. See,
e.g., the facts in Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1968).
Another costly burden on economic development is the requirement that tribes
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act before undertaking any industrial activity. Owing to federal supervision, tribes have been deemed federal agencies for the
purposes of the Act, Davis v. Morton, 335 F. Supp. 1258 (D.N.M. 1971); cf. Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (tribal businesses not federal instrumentalities
for tax purposes) ; Iron Crow v. Oglalla Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15 (D.S.D. 1955), affd,
291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (tribal courts not federal instrumentalities for jurisdictional
purposes). Elimination of ultimate federal discretion in tribal enterprises is the only means
of avoiding this discriminatory burden on tribal ownership.
55. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-415 (1970).
56. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 849, 357, 348a (1920).
57. HOUGH, supra note 1, at 38-44, details the Cheyenne River Sioux purchase-leaseback
ordinances.

58.

Id. at 48. See also Langore, The Heirship Land Problem and Its Effect on the In-
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action costs in mobilizing groups of heirs to pool their rights are
substantial. The long-run economic effect of allotment has therefore
been to so perversely subdivide resource ownership on reservations that development is at a competitive disadvantage with offreservation lands.
C.

UNCERTAIN

AUTHORITY

In addition to a lack of ultimate authority in economic matters,
tribes suffer from a lack of statutory or judicial delineation of even
those limited powers they can exercise. Tribes tend to be very conservative about risking an abuse of power because of their relative
inability to bear the costs of legal defense. Unfortunately, most recent case law seems to suggest that tribes must take the initiative
to protect what power they still possess from the states. For several
years the courts have conceded some general, residual governmental
powers in tribes, but have insisted upon defining it on a tribe-bytribe, and case-by-case basis.59 The Supreme Court has been thoroughly inconsistent. In Williams v. Lee it formulated the "infringement test," indicating that the states can exercise governmental
functions on reservations only to the extent that they do not impair
the right of the Indians to govern themselves.6 0 The Court interpreted this right of self-government rather broadly, but the case
was limited on its facts to civil jurisdiction. More than a decade
later, in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, the Court seemed to contract its earlier rule, emphasizing the importance of specific laws and treaties and denying the existence of any "Platonic"
principle or theory of tribal power. 6' This gave tribes no guidance
whatsoever. In 1975, Mr. Justice Rehnquist in U.S. v. Mazurie referred again in more general terms to tribal power as if it retained
some conceptual meaning for the Court.2 But the infringement test
is as much of the concept as we have seen yet. The Supreme Court
has applied the infringement concept very narrowly on the facts
of each case and given it no depth or structure, resulting in some
bizarre applications by the lower federal courts.6
dian, the Tribe, and Effective Utilization, printed in 1969

JOINT COMM. PRINT, Pt. 3, supra
note 1, at 519.
59. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), rev'g 487 F.2d 14 (1973) ; State ex
rel. Merril v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Iron Crow v. Ogalala Sioux Tribe, 129
F. Supp. 15 (D.S.D. 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
60. 358 U.S. 517 (1959).
61. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). See also the discussion of this litigation In J. WHrT, TAKING
FROM THOSE THEY FOUND HiEE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE
AmtEIcAN INDIAN (1972).
62. 419 U.S. 544 (1975), rev'g 407 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973).
63. E.g., Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co., 372 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.M. 1974)
United States v. Mazurie, 487 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 544; cf. United
States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 364 F. Supp. 192 (D. Mont. 1973).
An insidious danger in all of this Is that the cost of litigating tribal powers In this
way, tribe-by-tribe and power-by-power, may exceed the economic value of the exercise
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Infringement has been interpreted as a "vacuum" test, because
it seems to invite the states to fill any vacuum left by a non-exercise of tribal powers.6 4 By the same token, tribal power vis-a-vis
the federal government and its agencies might be called the "residue" test, the theory apparently being that the tribe retains all powers (from what starting point?) not assumed by another sovereign
under federal laws.65 Whether the conflict is state or federal, tribal
power has always been defined by negation. It is what is not taken
away by some other sovereignty. No one has offered any explanation of what ought to remain, and accordingly tribes do not begin
with the presumption, as we believe they should, that they possess
all of the regulatory powers of states. 6
D.

COSTLY CAPITAL MARKETS

The high costs borne by tribes when they enter the market in
search of capital would seem at first to be a purely economic problem. However, it is in fact the direct result of unnecessary legal
constraints imposed upon tribes by federal administration. The separation of ownership and control makes it costlier for tribes to negotiate for credit. Fragmentary ownership and the review power increase the costs and risks of business, and are reflected in higher
costs of borrowing. Uncertainty of law impairs the security of the
lender, a widespread and oft-heard complainte 7 Credit would be
much cheaper if debts could be collected with some certainty in
tribal courts, even subject to uniform tribal consumer-protection legislation. Another problem is the immunity of trust land from mortgages. e8 The federal government has assumed all along that a mortgage foreclosure must be pursuant to state law, and that the mortgagee must receive a fee patent upon foreclosure. There is no obof those powers. Non-Indians could not hope for a more effective means of neutralizing
tribes as economic competition.
64. WHITE, supra note 61.
65. Tribes retain all powers neither ceded by treaty nor abrogated by federal statute.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; Jones v. Meeham, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
66. Further confusion has been generated over the question whether the tribal courts
have jurisdiction over non-Indians. The power of tribes to tax non-Indians has not been
questioned for some time. Ogalala Sioux Tribe v. Barta, 146 F. Supp. 917 (D.S.D. 1956).
At least one tribe, the Navajo, routinely exercises full jurisdiction over non-Indians. Navajo
Tribe v. Orlando Helicopter Airways (Navajo Court of Appeals 1972). Symmetry seems to
require that if

a reservation

Indian has a

right to be sued in

his own tribal court, Wil-

liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), he can also sue a non-Indian wherever he finds him,
even on reservation. This kind of jurisdiction is implied in United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975). If tribal courts lack this jurisdiction, tribes cannot enforce their commercial regulations against businesses operated by non-Indians on the reservation.
67. Creditor security is especially a problem after Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S.
429

(1971);

See Mudd, Jurisdiction and the Indian Credit Problem:

Considerations for a

Solution, 33, MONT. L. R~v. 307 (1972). A related credit burden that most tribes have
jealously guarded and shown no inclination to discard is sovereign immunity. Dicke v.
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, Inc., 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Morgan v. Colorado River
Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421 (1968). Limited liability could, however, be consented
to for contractual obligations alone.
68. 25 U.S.C. §§ 202, 483a (1970).
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vious reason-except, perhaps, the United States' desire to protect
its own interest in tribal property-why tribes should not be free to
enact their own mortgage laws, limiting mortgages to less-than-fee
interests (such as a mere right to use or income for a term). Of
course, mortgage of less than a full fee means less credit, because
the security offered is somewhat less. On the other hand, it would
still offer more security and therefore lower risks and cost than the
present system, without substantial prejudice to the tribe's interest
in undivided control of its own lands.
These are some of the burdens upon economic development
that ought to weigh against the desirability of continued federal supervision. It remains to be seen how federal supervision might be
challenged in the courts.
Courts have consistently applied a notion of Indian goal-irrationality to justify both the general power of the United States to dispose
of, and specific power delegated to the Bureau to review the disposition of tribal resources.6 9 We infer this from the fact that these
powers have always been discussed in the context of the supposed
"dependency" of tribes and extraordinary discretion. "Plenary power" is a different concept than superior sovereignty. It implies a
power to act without constitutional restraint.
"Congress is invested with a wide discretion, and its action, unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the
courts. ' 70 "Congress alone has the right to determine the manner71
in which this country's guardianship . . . shall be carried out."
The only limits placed upon this power are that it be directed at
' 72
Some
what Congress "deems necessary to promote their welfare.
have suggested that this power is no broader than those which the
to the
Constitution allows in other cases, for example with regard
78
view.
popular
a
been
not
has
that
but
fifth amendment,
The Secretary of Interior is invested with a broad discretion in
69. Ultimate general authority remains in Congress. Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233
(1906); Romero v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 331 (1889). Therefore 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)
Is not a grant of general authority to the Bureau, but is only intended to comprehend
specific functions. Leecy v. United States, 190 F. 289 (8th Cir. 1911), app. dismissed, 232
U.S. 731 (1914) ; ci. Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 1908).
70. Perrin v. United States, 272 U.S. 478, 486 (1914).
71. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938). See also Gritts v. Fisher, 224
U.S. 640, 642-43 (1912); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation
V. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) state, "The power being political and administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts."
72. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1925). See also, United States v. Ramsey, 271
U.S. 467, 471 (1926) ; Perrin v. United States, 272 U.S. 478, 486 (1914).
78. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935) ; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1889). But cf. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497
(1937) : "Power to control and manage the property and affairs of Indians in good faith
for their betterment and welfare may be exerted In many ways and at times even in derogation of the provisions of a treaty." Although the United States can ignore the fifth
amendment to the extent of its power to take, it is less clear that it can escape liability for
Just compensation. United States v. Creek Nation, supra; Chippewa Indians v. United
States, 201 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1937).

-
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exercising review powers.74 Secretarial action is judicially reviewable, but apparently is subject to considerably less scrutiny than
75
other federal agency actions.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that the review power included a fiduciary relationship with respect to property management. 76 But it only went so far as to authorize inquiries into the
prudence of the Bureau's choice of means. The general social and
economic ends to which the Bureau applies tribal resources remain
discretionary, and noncompensable under present law. 77 This may
be the greater evil.
Federal supervisory powers are subject to attack on due process grounds. Because it granted Indians citizenship in 1924, it can
be argued that the United States is estopped from denying that it
intended to limit itself in its dealings with them to the same extent
that it is limited in its dealings with other citizens. This is not to suggest that Indians can under no circumstances be dealt with differently from others, a proposition repeatedly rejected by the courts.7 s
It is to say that those differences must be shown to be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and consistent with that "fundamental fairness" and
"concept of ordered liberty" generally applicable to the review of
federal action. Indeed, since Indian administration extends to all
persons of a certain degree of Indian blood, regardless of and not,
limited to political allegiance to tribes, it should be subjected to the
most rigorous standard applicable to racial categories.
At the very least, actions of the Bureau should be subjected to
strict scrutiny, rather than the limitless discretion usually accorded
them.7 9 Discretion is analogous to procedural fairness. Both are
functions of the extent to which the issue involves a substantial interest or right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Discretion is therefore broad only in case of aliens and persons reasonably deprived of their civil rights under law such as parolees.8 0 It cannot be denied that the interests at stake in Bureau
74. Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
75. Tooanippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970) ; applied in National Indian Youth Councilv. Bruce, 366 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd, 485 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
den., 415 U.S. 946 (1973).
76. Mason v. Oklahoma, 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
77. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 20 Ind. Cl. Comm.
131 (1968), aff'd, 427 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), overruling Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488
(1905). In Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-392 (1921), the Court emphasized the specific language of the citizen act ("shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the
right of any Indian to tribal or other property") and concluded: "guardianship arises from
their condition of tutelage or dependency; and It rests with Congress to determine when
the relationship shall cease; the mere grant of rights of citizenship not being sufficient to
terminate It."
79. See notes 71-75 supra.
80. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956)
(aliens) ; Shaughnessy v. United States
6x rel.Mezel, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
c6rt. den., 375 U.S. 957 (1963) (probation and parole) ; of. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(tenure at a state college) ; Dixon v. Alabama State

TRIBAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

actions are substantial. They include property interests which predated federal trusteeship and were never voluntarily relinquished,
and,, in whatever degree the Bureau retains control over the tribal
courts or courts of Indian offenses and liberty as well. These interests
are all protected by federal law, which is to say the various treaties with the Indian tribes. Although statutes can supersede treaties,"'
presumably the statutes themselves must be constitutional in their
application to citizens before they can have this effect. It cannot seriously be contended that a cure in an underlying constitutional defect
in a statute is effected whenever it can be shown that the statute af52
fects a treaty.
Appropriate review standards would not only provide tribes an
opportunity to challenge the justification for specific Bureau actions,
but would in addition call into question the inherent inefficiencies
and conflicts of interest of the agency as a whole. Furthermore, if
it is admitted that the agency must conform with due process, then
the statutes creating and directing the agency must also be subject
to fifth amendment challenge, and should be voidable except upon
a showing that they are at least reasonably (if not compellingly) related to the economic and social advancement of tribes or expressly
delegated to the Congress or the agency by the tribes themselves. 83
There is a certain special constitutional significance to these
challenges which arises out of the early history of the republic. One
of America',s most bitter grievances against Britain was the reviewability of provincial laws by the Privy Council, an executive agency
of the Crown in London. Defenders of British prerogative insisted
that the power was exercised for America's protection from local
political abuses and lack of coordination with national (imperial)
policies." American colonists then, like Indians now, had no direct
representation in Parliament. Consequently the danger understood
by all was that Britain would rule America for Britain's welfare
alone. Indeed, the typical American argument in challenge of this
policy, before words came to blows, was that the colonists as subjects of the Crown could not be cut off from Magna Carta except by
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. den., 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (expulsion of
student from a state university).
81. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1885); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870). See also Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889).
82. We are not aware of any case precisely in point. The cases cited in note 81 supra,
in support of the supremacy of statutes over treaties, were all decided before general citicenship.
83. An argument could be made that no federal supervision of tribal property Is consistent with due process requirements, as long as tribes are not independently represented
In Congress, and the United States has reversionary interests in all tribal lands.
84. An excellent discussion of the British doctrine of colonial trusteeship is to be found
in Burrows & Wallace, The Ideology and Psychology of National Liberation, 6 PERsPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 167 (1972). See also A. SCHLESINGER, THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1776 (1918), which details the economic detriment8 Americans perceived as arising from this policy.
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their own consent. There is thus a particularly odious hypocrisy in
denying the identical claims of a class of American citizens today.
Power over a political community within the federal system can
arise only by its consent. It hardly needs repeating here that the
underlying principle of the federal union is contractual sovereignty.
Yet, as a general rule, treaties with tribes say nothing regarding a
power to review their domestic affairs.8 5 The Indian Reorganization
Act does not give the Secretary of the Interior any regular review
powers. 8 However, most of the tribal constitutions promulgated un7
der the I.R.A. contain provisions requiring Secretarial approval.
In the context of these constitutions this power appears to have
arisen as a delegation of power from tribe to agency, analogous to
any delegation of legislative power to an executive body, and it
ought accordingly to be freely revocable at the option of the tribe. A
tribe constitutional provision requiring approval for any amendment
must be regarded as void insofar as it may be interpreted to deprive
the tribe of its power to terminate its delegation. Otherwise it
would render the tribal government, and the I.R.A, wholly without
meaning. A power to grant implies a power to revoke, each requiring as much sovereign authority as the other.
It is appropriate to emphasize the fact that the "dependency"
of tribes must be understood as contingent. Even lunatics have a
right to seek remission by a competent court. When, and according
to what criteria, will tribes be accorded full political competence?
Obviously, no criteria relating to political competence have ever
been established, although many have been suggested or been tried
experimentally 8 If Congress remains the sole judge, history suggests that the only criterion will be demand for tribal resources.
The courts have no better grounds on which to avoid this issue as
a "political question" than they have to avoid the issue of discrimin85. An exception was the Umatillas where the tribe agreed to "engage to submit to and
observe all laws, rules, and regulations which may be prescribed by the United States."
Treaty of June 9, 1885, with the Walla-Walla, Cayuse, Umatilla Tribes, and Bands of
Indians In Washington and Oregon Territories, art. VIII, 12 Stat. 945, discussed in United
States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888); cf. Treaty of June 1, 1868, with the Navajo
Tribe, 15 Stat. 667, discussed in Williams v. Lee, 858 U.S. 217 (1959). Congress obviously
knew how to specify a cession of full regulatory power when it wanted to.
86. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-77 (1970) provide only for approval of the original incorporation
and subsequent revocation or amendment.
87. Significantly, tribal constitutions differ in the scope of the review power delegated
to the Secretary, and the manner In which It may be exercised. See, e.g., ROSBUt
Sioux
CONSTITUTION art. 4 (specifying which tribal acts must be approved) ; LOWER ELWHA INDIAN COMMUNITY CONSTITUTION art. 5 (manner of review). Both of these constitutions, like
many others, provide for a referendum and Secretarial approval to revoke the review
power. In addition, any tribe that adopts the Bureau law and order code accepts by its
terms and until it enacts its own code, 25 C.F.R. 11.74 (1975) which makes no tribal ordinance enforceable until approved.
88. E.g., flat time limits pursuant to the original allotment acts; administrative findings
of Individual "competence" and issuance of a certificate of competence under current regulations for allottees, the states' willingness to assume the economic burdens of jurisdiction
over tribes under Pub. L. No. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1970)).

TRIBAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

327

ation against other racial minorities, nor should they evade their
clear duty of judicial review by producing a new definition of federal power not found in the Constitution-"plenary power over Indian affairs." The judiciary is necessary as a check on the legislature precisely because a majoritarian process tends to impose the
power of the state on minorities, whose only other refuge is local
self-government8 9 As Wirt argued to the Supreme Court on behalf
of the Cherokees almost a century and a half ago, the judiciary
must be unafraid to act even when unpopular acts invite the contempt of the other two branches. 9
V. ADVANTAGES OF TRIBAL OWNERSHIP
Tribal ownership and control of natural resource development
is both a lawful and an economically preferable alternative to federal or tribal regulation of private enterprise. The demonstrated
inefficiencies of federal administration have made it impossible for
tribes to enjoy a satisfactory share of resource revenues. Tribal resources have served as little more than low-interest savings accounts, with the greater part of total revenue leaving the reservation as wages and profits to non-Indians. Simple solutions are not
adequate to the task. Bidding up rents and royalties will increase
income without stemming the outflow of wages and profits, if indeed
it does not eliminate the principal existing attraction of reservation investment. Taxation would have the identical effect. Reorganizing the Bureau and disambiguating the law, together with a stronger tribal court system, may reduce significantly the costs of outside firms doing business on reservations and make it possible to
bid up rents and royalties, but cash outflow will still continue.
One alternative is to invest tribal funds in secondary and tertiary industries in hopes of recapturing some of this: outflow. Presumably if outside labor finds suitable opportunities to spend money on the reservation where they work, that is where they will spend
it.9" Another possibility is to invest tribal funds in human capital
development, minimizing the likelihood that primary industries on
reservations will need to import labor.9 2 Quotas on employment of
reservation citizens, if they can be negotiated without corresponding rent or royalty reductions, could also minimize the outflow of
revenue due to wages. But neither possibility promises to have any
effect on the revenue going to compensate outside investors.
Why shouldn't the tribes, as owners of reservation resources,
89.

THE

FEDERALIST NO.

51

(A.

Hamilton).

With

regard to Indians,

both protections

must coincide. The security of local government is Illusory without judicial checks upon
the power of the majority to render that government impotent.
90. PETERs, THE CASE OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 155 (1831).
91. This may be Gilbreath's argument. GILBREATH, supra note 27.
92. The Bureau has consistently taken this view. See notes 28 & 29 supra.
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also become capitalists and employers? One argument often heard
is that tribes are incompetent to manage such large firms. But the
same might be said of the directors of many private companies,
who hire experts to analyze marketing and production problems.
There is no reason why tribes cannot do likewise. There is also a
feeling that the current arrangement (leasing) makes development
"free." After all, the tribe contributes no capital, and in fact contributes only what it has always had without expense: its resources.
Selling nonrenewable resources at anything less than the maximum possible return is hardly free. It is a loss of potential income.
And if the underlying reason for this attitude is an assumption that
tribes cannot accumulate the capital necessary to go into business,
the answer is that they can borrow private capital in the same manner as private firms, and can, in addition, participate in some federal grant and loan programs.9 3 As in any business, the only relevant consideration is whether the rate of return on capital invested
in development will exceed the cost to the tribe of borrowing it.
There is finally a dark hint that tribal ownership is socialistic
or un-American.9 4 This has a significant history all its own. From
the beginning, Indians have been accused of a kind of primitive, diseconomical communism. Many early cases and observations seemed to indicate that this was the affliction from which the savages
had to be saved. 95 But rather than tribes becoming more capitalistic, America has become increasingly socialized. Many means of
transportation are publicly owned and operated on a theory that
they could not be adequately maintained by private capital, and other industries are publicly owned purely for purposes, of revenue,
93. Tribal bonds might be tax-free if used solely for financing public services or public
industries flowing directly into the tribal treasury. See McDaniel, Federal Income Taxation
of Industrial Bonds: The Public Interest, 1 URAN IAWYER 157 (1969). Tribal bonds could,
of course, be secured by revenue rather than land. In addition tribes might Invest their
trust funds In resource Industries. According to Sorkin, Indian Trust Funds, printed in
1969 JOINT COMM. PRINT, pt. 2, supra note 1, at 452, these funds were Invested at up to
61/% in 1968 by the Treasury Department. That was at about the prevailing rate of interest on government bonds in that year, and rather below the return on corporate bonds.
FEDERAL REsERvE BuLLETIN A34 (April 1971). Sorkin attributes failure of tribes to invest
these funds in their own industrialization to inexperience and the fear that they will lose
revenue. It should be observed In light of the argument we are making, that a small loss
In rate of return might be compensated for in new infrastructure, human capital dvelopment, and the relative efficiency of direct wage subsidies over administering the redistribution of Investment income.
94. According to HouGH, supra note 1, at 202, this is a reason cited by the Bureau for
discouraging tribal ownership.
95. The most poignant example that comes to mind is of the successive redemption and
subjugation of the Pueblos. At first the Supreme Court explained, "If the Pueblo Indians
differ from the other inhabitants of New Mexico in holding lands in common, and in a
certain patriarchal forms of domestic life, they only resemble in this regard the Shakers
and other communistic societies in this country, and cannot for that reason" be deprived
of their political autonomy. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617-618 (1876). A generation later, the same Court recanted, "The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather
than nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless
Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. Always living in separate and isolated
communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced, by superstition and
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such as state liquor stores. During times of low income and high unemployment, today and forty years ago, the government turned to
public employment as a means of directly subsidizing wage-earners.
If tribes choose now to finance infrastructure, obtain revenue for
public services, and subsidize their citizens' wages by means of public industry, they are following many established precedents. Tribes
cannot be expected to be more capitalistic than the capitalists. It
remains to be seen, however, whether to some extent the law requires them to be.
On the other hand, states derive more local benefit from a conventional business economy than tribes. In a diversified local economy, income recirculates. Wages from local firms return to other
community enterprises as consumer spending and become wages
again. Community capitalists also return income to local business
in the form of consumer spending. But tribes generally have little
in the way of retail or service industries; they are usually too small
to support a diversified economy. Consequently reservation wages
tend to be spent elsewhere, and reservation profits tend to be invesed elsewhere.
Taxing reservation business profits at a rate high enough to compensate for this outflow of wages and profits might discourage businesses from locating on the reservation in the first place. An alternative is to keep profits in the local economy by maximizing reservation (individual and tribal) ownership. Tribal ownership can offset some of the obstacles of federal supervision and increase the profitability of some resources, relative to individual Indian ownership.
It can also accomplish the redistributive objectives of state and
federal regulation.
A.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

If, as we argued above, federal supervision results in a discriminatorily high cost of doing business on reservation, then tribes may
prove better able to overcome this obstacle (while it lasts) than individual Indian entrepreneurs. Tribal ownership may reduce the number of costly, duplicative transactions, lower the cost of credit, and
increase the security of business property rights.
Federal supervision increases the number of steps in negotiation
of reservation business arrangements. Each step adds delay and
fetishism, and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior people." United States v.
Sandoval,

231 U.S.

28, 39 (1913)

(emphasis added).

(The Court was particularly offended

by the Pueblos' habit of not allowing the mails through on ceremonial days, forgetting that
the mails stop on another ceremonial day, Sunday, everywhere else.) Relinquishing common property was therefore a condition of freedom. See note 88 supra. "Self-sufficient"
communal groups have no difficulty enjjoying constitutional liberties. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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uncertainty. One way of minimizing this cost is by minimizing the
number of transactions subject to Bureau review that will be necessary to develop a given resource fully. The more entrepreneurs
have control of the reservation resource, the greater the number
of transactions that inevitably will be involved in developing it fully. Therefore there will always be an economy of scale in consolidating a resource into a single tribal ownership.
In addition, a tribe can marshal more power to contest non-approval than its members. Falling back on its treasury, its power to
tax, and its business income, the tribe is better able to retain counsel, lobby, and litigate. Tribal leaders have more political "clout"
than individual Indians; their official capacity gives them more access to congressmen and the Executive office. The Bureau is more
likely to exercise its veto powers over a number of private entrepreneurs than over a single tribal owner.
Because of its resources, taxing power, (albeit limited) ability
to influence congressional grant and subsidy policy, and continuous
corporate existence, a tribal owner offers better security for a potential commercial lender than an individual Indian. To be sure, tribes
enjoy sovereign immunity, but they may waive it in particular cases.
Waiver has been construed as consent to suit in state courts, 6 but
the tribe could expressly require that it be sued in its own courts,
or that its own substantive law be applied. As long as the tribes'
courts and law offer predictability comparable to state courts, even
a waiver of immunity so limited would go far to minimize the costs
of uncertainty in the enforcement of its contracts.
The principle offsetting factor i's the susceptibility of tribes to
the National Environmental Protection Act. Although tribes may be
better able to overcome other problems of federal supervision than
individual entrepreneurs, this problem applies to them alone. In the
balance, its effect may be small. There is, in addition, a more persuasive reason for preferring tribal ownership in the resource area
which would apply even in the absence of federal supervision: greater economic efficiency.

B. EFFICIENCY
Under certain limited circumstances, the net revenue of a regulated firm may actually exceed the net revenue of private enterprise engaged in the same activities. The chief criteria are exclusion
problems infrastructure (or "public goods"), externalities, and fractional ownership.
96. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962),
Morgan v. Colorado River Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968).

distinguished in
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1. Exclusion problems
Some natural resources (oil, water and fisheries) are "fugaceous"
-that is, they do not respect boundary lines but move freely and
almost uncontrollably. It is moreover impossible to tag or identify
every gallon of water or every fish. Ordinarily, the maximization
of revenue is achieved by selling when prices are high and saving
when they are low. But it is not feasible (or very costly) for individual owners! to try to save fugaceous resources, because they have
no real physical control over them. As a result, all owners or persons with access to a fugaceous resource are in a constant struggle
to use it up as quickly-not necessarily as profitably-as they physically can. The total profit produced is lower, and in addition the
97
resource tends to be depleted too quickly.
If the resource cannot be divided into separate parcels, one alternative is to develop it all under a single ownership that can exclude
all others. This has the advantage of efficiently allocating the resource over time, but at the risk of encouraging monopoly. Monopoly
prices can be avoided, however, either through close public scrutiny,
or through public ownership. If there is only a single franchise, in
fact, public ownership behaves significantly like regulation, and
avoids double administration. Neither solution to monopoly prices is
completely satisfactory, however. A regulated company has little incentive to cut costs when these can be recovered in the rate formula.
Bureaucrats managing a public firm and drawing fixed incomes similarly have little incentive to cut costs or otherwise maximize profits. 95
These drawbacks are not applicable to tribal ownership. There is
no substantial danger of monopoly pricing because the tribal firm
must sell its product in a competitive, interstate market; only a negligible quantity of goods such as coal and oil would be saleable on
the reservation. Furthermore, the bureaucrats in the tribal firm share
in its profits because of the characteristic distribution of a part of
tribal income in direct per capita payments. The small size of the
tribe maximizes the incentive of profit sharing, and minimizes the
risk that the tribal firm will be unresponsive to pressure from its
citizens to cut costs to the extent that they rank among its consumers. 99
97. The economics may be found in Crutchfield, supra note 3; J. HIRSCHTLEIFER,
DEHAVEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY (1966).

J.

98. Here we disagree with Posner, supra note 44, at 338, who argues that bureaucracies
are no less efficiency-motivated than private firms. In his opinion, the desire for promotion and the possibility of later stepping into private executive positions is sufficient incentive. This of course assumes that there are an adequate number of promotional levels
and positions in private Industry demanding similar skills and experience. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs is probably one of the worst agencies for incentive going by these criteria.
99. By comparison, the states have chosen to deal with exclusion problems either by
closely administering all location and production, as in the water and petroleum industries;
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2.

Infrastructure

The components of "infrastructure," such as transportation, communications, and power transmission, are characterized by steep initial costs and relatively low marginal costs. The fixed facilities (e.g.,
tracks, lines), once built, cost about the same to maintain regardless of how many persons use them. Moreover, their general social
benefits, which can be thought of as economic articulation, are enjoyed by everyone in the community, not only those persons purchasing their services. It is therefore difficult if not impossible to obtain private financing for such a project-the investment is too great,
the time until it shows a profit too long, and many if not most of its
real benefits not recaputurable as revenue. 00
Financing and operating infrastructure are frequently undertaken
by local government. In the alternative, local government invests in
and grants the subsidy of monopoly to a private firm, conditioned
upon rate regulation. By either method, taxation and borrowing on
public credit are essential sources of the necessary capital. On reservations, raising capital for infrastructure creates a vicious circle.
Tribes lack adequate tax bases without industry; indeed, for many
of them primary industry is or will tend to be their principle source
of revenue and the only security for their creditors. At the same
time, the absence of suitable infrastructure can be expected to be a
'cost to reservation enterprises and thereby reduce tribal revenues.
It seems logical for tribes simultaneously to develop both infrastructure and resource production. By coordinating these two facets
of development, tribes can channel resource revenue directly back
into upgrading infrastructure and, accordingly, maximize future returns. Many facilities useful to private resource industries can be developed into multipurpose public utilities. If coal development, for
example, requires telephones, rail lines, and roads, expanding these
basic services to meet domestic needs will cost less than meeting the
developer's and area needs in two independent and uncoordinated systems. The relatively small size or small number of towns on most
reservations means that public and private utility needs can be
served by vitually the same network.
3.

Externalities

Many resource industries have a tendency to create "externalities"-costs external to the apparent book value of the enterprise.
or, paradoxically, by limiting production to such Inefficient techniques that the resource is
never in danger of depletion, characteristic of fishery management. Both are extremely
costly. See Myers, POOLING AND UNITIZATION

(1937)

; WATER SUPPLY, supra note 97; Crutch-

field, supra note 3.
100. See, e.g., Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC ECONOMY
(Margolis and Posner eds. 1965).
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The most familiar externality is environmental damage. Because it
may be insidious, thinly and widely spread, and tend to affect all
persons whether or not they are consumers of the product, private
action to remedy environmental damage is costly to mobilize and unlikely to be effective. 0 1 The government may intervene, but even
then often in vain, because the damage may be irreversible and not
compensable. In that case, public control is the only practical solution.
Since the land base of most tribes is severely limited, environmental externalities may pose an unusually serious threat. The community can little afford to lose any potentially developable surface
or water. It ought therefore to be entitled to resort to more radical
means to preserve its territorial security.
4. Fractional ownership
Finally, where a large portion of the reservation is individually
owned in fractional shares, private development bears higher costs
of accumulating adequate property than on state lands. Eminent domain could be justified as a cheap way of consolidating reservation
property if exercised on behalf of a tribal enterprise rather than a
private firm.
Any consideration of the costs of tribal resource economies must
recognize that some resources, such as water, petroleum, and fisheries, not only cross ownership units within the reservation, but cross
reservation boundaries into neighboring states. Consequently any attempt by a tribe to limit the rate of exploitation of these resources
can be wholly frustrated by the failure of states to impose equal
limits. The states could take advantage of tribes by exploiting what
2

tribes conserve.

0

For example, the federal interest in preserving its own prerogatives with respect to water has resulted in a special analogy to the
reserve rights doctrine. 03 Under this rule a fixed quota is reserved
for tribal purposes pursuant to some evaluation of future requirements. A quota cannot, however, be accurately preserved without
101. If there Is no adequate, inexpensive legal remedy for the damage, those affected
must organize either to settle directly with the industry or retaliate by not purchasing its
product. Some of those affected will undoubtedly be "free riders" and let others bear the
cost of action. Moreover, settlement costs money, and the victims of externalities are often
not consumers of the goods. On a reservation, where incomes are low and the industries
In issue have national markets, self-help holds little promise.
102. As recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S.
194 (1975). the states can impose non-discriminatory limitations ft, Indian treaty hunting
and fishing off reservation if they bear a reasonable relationship to conservation. State
regulatory authority on reservation has never been recognized. Burnett, Indian Hunting,
Fishing and Trapping Rights: The Record and the Controversy, 7 IDAHO L. Rlv. 49, 53
(1970).
103. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574 (1908), approved in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963).
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some coordinate measuring and regulating agency. In past cases
there has been an unfortunate tendency for the federal "trustee" of
these reserve rights to defer regulation to the interested states. 10
The ordinary solution to this problem within the federal system
is interstate compact. 105 By establishing coordinate agencies with
broad supervisory powers, the states have contrived to apportion their
fugaceous resources to their mutual satisfaction, with some flexibility over time, and more comprehensively than private contracts
can provide. No compact power has ever been recognized in tribes
as such, although a number of tribes routinely contract for services
from neighboring -states, under the supervision of the Bureau.
In the absence of any explicit prohibition of tribal compact, it
seems appropriate for tribes to be included within the meaning of
the interstate compact clause. Any other interpretation would frustrate the purpose of that provision, which can be understood as authorizing regional economic and resource planning. The alternative
of repeated tribe-state adjudication of respective rights in resources
on the basis of "equitable apportionment," of which states avail
themselves in the absence of compact, will always be defective for
want of procedures for routine enforcement. 106
C.

REDISTRIBUTION

Like taxation, regulation can be manipulated to penalize some
forms of activity and motivate others. 10 7 When it creates a legal monopoly, regulation subsidizes the regulated firm, which in turn can be
committed, in its rate structure, to provide service at above cost
to disfavored enterprises and below cost to favored ones. Ideally
these trade-offs will cancel one another out; otherwise the government must channel public funds into the regulated firm to underwrite its rate.
Rate structures could be used to tax private enterprises for the
benefit of public (tribal) industries, unless the individual tribe's constitution forbade unequal taxes. For example, privately-owned businesses could be charged higher rates for power or water supplies by
104. Cf. Rees-Jones, Problems in the Development of Mineral Resources on Indian Lands,
7 ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INST. 661 (1972) (discussion of federal adoption of state pooling and unitization).
105. An illustrative review of the history and use of the compact device is found in ZIMMERMAN & WENDALL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE

1925 (1951).

106. The process of "equitable apportionment" lacks a general theory of relative entitlement and does not therefore lend security to resource development even when its outcome
Is enforceable. The case of United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, is of special interest because it resulted not
only in a complex apportionment of the resource (fisheries), but explicitly relies upon
tribe-State cooperative administration for enforcement. No joint agency has yet been agreed

upon.

107. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL JOUR. OF ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 22
(1971).
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the tribe, and tribal members could be charged rates below cost.
Since the proceeds of a tribal business are distributed directly or indirectly to the tribe at large, there is little to distinguish taxing to
underwrite a tribal enterprise from an ordinary tax for fiscal purposes. 08
Tribes, like states, enjoy a rather broad discretion in choosing
who shall be taxed.'" Tax equity is never perfect. Property may be
taxed whether or not the owner is able to vote in the taxing jurisdiction. However, the owner has a choice not to place his property
within the jurisdiction of another government.
Government enforcement of an equitable distribution of wealth is
often regarded as economic heresy. The goal of the market system
is to maximize aggregate national wealth. It is assumed ex hypothesi
that dollars will recirculate freely, so that in the last analysis everyone will benefit from them in proportion to their efforts. Accordingly
any indication that tribes value the sharing of wealth has been interpreted as evidence of irrationality, backwardness, and business
incompetence, and serves to justify and perpetuate trusteeship. 1 0
In point of fact, tribes that seek to achieve income-leveling may
have a more sophisticated utilitarian theory than their critics.
Wealth is a subjective measure. It does not now and has never
meant dollars to utilitarians. Dollars merely serve to make the measurement of individual preferences cheap and convenient, on the
idealistic assumption that the more of them we are willing to give
up for something, the more satisfaction we expect from that something. The goal of a market system is therefore not to maximize
the dollars in motion, as such, but to maximize the aggregate of
individual satisfactions that dollars 'somewhat imperfectly represent.
An individual's belief that he has obtained a fair share of his
community's wealth is also of value, both to him and to the community."' Each person's subjective satisfaction may thus be imagined as a mix of actual material wealth and a feeling of fair share.
These are to some degree proportional: the more goods an indivi108. Even non-members enjoy some benefits. Law and order, fire protection, schools,
power and utilities and roads are some or all of them provided by tribal governments.
State taxes are "not to be presumed lacking in due process of law because of inequalities
or objections, so long as arbitrary action is avoided." Wagner v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207, 216
(1915). See also United Air Lines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623, 629 (1973). The Court will not
act on mere "disputable degrees of benefit" even in dealing with a use tax. Myles Salt Co.
V. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478, 485 (1916). Tribes surely must have the power to tax
resident non-members If states and cities can tax the property and income of non-residents
found within their jurisdiction.
109. Ogalala Sioux Tribe of the Pine River Reservation v. Barta, 146 F. Supp. 917 (D.S.D.
1956), aff'd, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. den., 358 U.S. 932, was an action to collect
a tribal tax on non-members. It relied on an earlier non-member tax case, Buster v.
Wright, 195 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905). Both cases involved jurisdictional issues; neither questioned the legitimacy of the taxes themselves.
110. See note 95 supra.
111.

See,

e.g.,

UNITED
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(especially chapter 7).
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dual has, the more he considers himself to be fairly participating
in the community. In the same way, the more some individuals have,
the less fairly others perceive themselves as treated. Minimizing
this gap is also maximizing aggregate utility. Because the value of
a fair share is subjective and presumably idiosyncratic, there is no
more reason to believe that maximizing it can only be achieved
by absolute income-equalization, than that more conventionally defined
utility can be maximized only when everyone has the same number
112
of televisions, toasters, tea-trays, and artichokes.
Minimizing the gap appears to be what many Indian communities have been doing all along. 113 It may in fact help to explain the
political cohesiveness of tribes relative to industrialized non-Indian
America. In the terms used above, fair share is a "good" like any
other. But it is a "public" good, which is to say that people do not
ordinarily buy and sell it in the marketplace. Rather, it is allocated
through the political process. There is a danger here, that fair share,
like other public goods, will be provided in proportion to wealth-a
contradiction of purpose. Influence in the political process tends to
reflect wealth as well as numbers. 1 4 But this danger is minimized
if differences in wealth are at the outset small and the community
itself is small enough so that the costs of being heard are easily
met. This describes most tribes.
It is' important to recognize that we are not living in an ideal
world in which each individual chooses to work, and thereby to earn,
as much as he pleases. This is particularly true of the reservation
economy. With industries: running at a very high rate of efficiency,
not all persons may be able to be employed. At that point a hard
choice must be made: whether to go to -less efficient industries that
are more labor-intensive, to cut wages and take on more labor, or
to tax the employed to subsidize the unemployed. In a system of
pure private enterprise, only the latter is possible. Public enterprise
makes it feasible to spread the productive worth of the community
directly through wages, rather than through welfare. To the extent
112. As indicated earlier, the Bureau has endorsed the view that Indian sharing is antideveloment and retrogressive. See note 28 supra. Actually, it can be argued that Indian
sharing is less of a discouragement to economic growth than taxation. Sharing is voluntary, therefore sharers must derive some individual satisfaction out of it. They obtain more
satisfaction in earning a dollar to give to a relative, than earning a dollar to spend. On
the contrary, taxation is coercive. Persons taxed lose satisfaction in the process, preferring
to spend a dollar than Pay it in taxes. Thus sharing is a positive efficiency in tribal economics and cannot explain that low motivation which we believe is more correctly attributed
to discriminatory, high costs of capital and doing business imposed from without.
113. There has been little study of the private economy of Indian communities. The
value of distributive equity in traditional Navajo communities is suggested by Hobson,
Navajo Acquisitive Values 42(3), PAPERS OF THE PEABODY MUSEUM OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY (1954).
114. Stigler, Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL. JOUR. OF EcoN. AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 3
(1971), discussed in Posner, supra note 44, at 343.
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that employment as such is satisfying, the subsidy of a dollar of
wages is actually larger than the subsidy of a dollar of welfare. 115
Any such redistribution is a maze of trade-offs. Reducing or
taxing wages cuts -into the incentive to work, so that there is less to
go around. Switching to more labor-intensive industries cuts into revenue and so, too, leaves less to go around. This reduction in aggregate material wealth is, in a very real sense, the price a community
pays for equity. That price may be high or low, depending upon the
community's valuation of fair share. The more the concept of fair
share tends to be esteemed, the less wage-spreading will reduce incentive, and the more spreading wage-earners will tolerate politically.
Distributive equity is not entirely foreign to our law. Ad valorem
taxes have long been utilized to finance public services, which if
privately operated would be too costly for most citizens to afford.
Similarly, rate schedules in regulated industries are intricate redistributive engines, frequently levying above-cost rates against some consumers so as to be able to provide below-cost rates to others. In
either case a judgment has been made that certain goods ought to be
distributed on a per capita, rather than income basis. These goods
might be called necessities. The demand for these necessities is income-inelastic-as people grow wealthier they do not significantly
increase the proportion of their income devoted to these goods. In
relative terms, then, everyone places the same value on them, but
because of differences in income, some persons may not be able to
afford them at all. Regulation or taxation can assure a minimum
level of these goods to everyone.
In traditional distributive equity, the administrator chooses how
the subsidy will be used by its beneficiaries. This is true whether
the subsidy is in the form of direct public services, cheaper private services, or conditional cash subsidies such as food stamps. The
agency responsible determines for the ultimate consumer which goods
are inelastic, and in so doing may misallocate both durable and intangible resources. After all, effective efforts toward "maximizing
fair share" must be based, at least in part, on an understanding
that the individually perceived fairness of dollar distribution depends
upon what it can be or is in fact spent on. The more the limitations,
generally the less effective the redistribution in utilitarian terms,
albeit conditions may be useful in achieving external objective goals
such as standardized housing. Indians are already famihar with these
problems; they know it as, trusteeship.
115. Wage subsidies also have the advantage of eliminating duplicative administration.
A welfare subsidy such as AFDC involves both a tax collection agency and a distribution
agency. Tribal ownership results in some subsidy appearing directly in wages without any
separate distribution administration, and the remainder paid automatically Into the treasury without separate collection.
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Tribal enterprise can come closer to maximizing utility. Out of
revenue it provides both cash and services to tribal citizens. In small
communities governed largely by consensus, the choice of which services to provide directly is more likely to reflect what is in fact generally desired. Beyond that, consumers are given the means to choose
goods according to individual subjective preference. The only risk
is that redistributed cash will tend to leave the reservation (as consumer spending), whereas provision of direct services by the tribe
will provide additional employment on the reservation. This is in fact
only partly true, because many goods simply are not going to be
produced by the tribe in any event, and will always have to be purchased outside whether by consumers or by the tribe itself. On the
other hand, consumer capital can be expected to attract retail and
service industries to the reservation. In the long run, tribal enterprise will spur a diversification of the tribe's domestic economy. This
process could be accelerated through the lending of tribal revenue
to citizens of the tribe for investment in tertiary industries.
It is simply not appropriate to equate the economies of tribal
ownership with those of public ownership by a state. Owing to the
size of the community and the degree of political participation, there
is no considerable attenuation of public control over the management.
Management is or can be conducted by the people or their elected
representatives to at least the same degree that it can be conducted
by shareholders in a corporation. Revenue is distributed along with
other tribal income and by the same process, and is therefore no
more subject to political abuse than it is in the publicly held corporation. Nor is there any substantial danger of the majority abusing
individual expectations in property so long as the business involves
natural resources. Water, fisheries, and most subsurface rights
are already tribal public domain; moreover, exploitation of most
mineral resources is so extensive that it is unlikely to affect only a
11 6
small fraction of voters.
There are in addition two blessings of public ownership that may
be peculiar to small, relatively impoverished communities. Besides
draining off a share of industrial revenue, the influx of labor associated with attracting some private industries requires an expansion
of public services. In all likelihood the cost of new housing and utilities could not be borne entirely by employees through taxes on
wages. The tribe could provide in its leases that developers furnish
their own employee facilities, but this cost would come out of tribal
rents. Either way, the tribe is forced to invest in human services
for non-members, and furthermore, these services once established
116. See note 126 infra, respecting possible due process limitations on tribal proceedings
affecting individual interests in resources.
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will often be useful for only a limited time. In the hydroelectric
and petroleum industries, for example, only the initial construction
phase is labor-intensive. In mining, labor is necessary for production,
but production ceases when the resource is depleted-perhaps a
generation at best in contemporary strip mining of coal. Abandoned
services may be only partially salvageable. Some, such as power
transmission and communications, could be integrated into the tribe's
existing infrastructure, assuming that by that time further infrastructure expansion is still desirable. Housing and education, on the
other hand, will continue to be useful only to the extent that tribal
population has grown to fill abandoned capacity. Alternatively, if
employees remain on the reservation without earning taxable wages,
17
they become a welfare burden on the tribe.
Large corporations: attracted to reservations are often considerably wealthier than the tribes that host them. There is an inevitable
political hazard that tribal governments will become captives of corporate interest. This is particularly true where the resource being
exploited is worth more to the company than all of the existing revenue of the tribe-probably always the case of tribes with singleresource economies. If exploitation requires the commitment of corporate funds to fixed plants, the tribe may in effect hold these sunk
assets for ransom, but that does not entirely alleviate the risk. The
only complete solution is public ownership and control.
VI.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR TRIBAL OWNERSHIP

It remains to be seen whether tribal ownership and the arguments that can be made for it are consistent with present law. Applicable standards are necessarily either federal or tribal.",, Among
the possible theories of federal review, three are significant: tribal
privilege, due process, and federal antitrust limitations.
A.

TRIBAL PRIVILEGE

Owing to their unique status within the federal system, tribes
should have a greater liberty to engage in public ownership than
the states. It is generally agreed that the United States Constitution
does not apply to tribes automatically."19 Some provisions have been
117.

Any inefficiency arising out of the employment of less skilled reservation labor may

still be less than the cost of expanding human services to new population.
118. See Pinaky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963). Many familiar limita-

tions such as the prohibition against the lending of public credit are entirely state constitutional in origin.
119.

Native

American Church v.

Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131

(10th

Cir. 1959).

But cf. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965), later distinguished in Settler
v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969). In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959), tribal power was identified as existing "absent governing Acts of Congress."
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extended to tribes in substance by statute. 120 In all other cases, the
limitations tribes place upon themselves by consent (e.g., treaty) and
their own constitutions must control.
The fourteenth amendment due process clause has traditionally
served as the basis for constitutional challenges to state regulatory
and proprietary schemes.121 Regulation has been attacked as a taking
of private property without compensation and often as a taking. for
private use. It is not entirely clear whether the due process provision
of the Indian Civil Rights Act requires federal reviewing courts to
apply conventional federal standards. The Act refers both to takings
without due process of law, and to takings for public use without
just compensation. However, the Act should be read in the context
of earlier legislation which it does not purport to repeal, most importantly the Indian Reorganization Act. The I.R.A. authorizes tribes
to organize, manage their own property, and adopt federal corporation status in addition to or in the place of tribal governmental status. 122 Since the repeal of the General Allotment Act, the emphasis
has been on rebuilding the tribal domain, rather than allowing it to
fragment into individual estates, a strange policy if the tribes are to
have no power to develop and use their public property. 2 3 Federal
agencies have repeatedly approved and financed tribally owned and
operated businesses."2
Recent litigation indicates that the courts will be selective in
applying traditional due process standards to tribes. 1 25 They are
accepting cases brought under tribal constitutional provisions and requiring exhaustion of remedies, suggesting that tribal due process
120. Of greatest significance among these is 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), sometimes referred
to as the Indian Bill of Rights.
121. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), established the framework for challenges to
economic regulation.
122. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (1970). Senator Wheeler, one of the co-sponsors of these provisions, said of them that they "(seek) further to give the Indians the control of their
own affairs and of their own property; to put it in the hands either of an Indian council
or in the hands of a corporation to be organized by the Indians." 78 CoNa. REc. 11125
(1934). 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) is, in our opinion, sufficient authority for tribal ownership.
Federal incorporation, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970), is unnecessary, and a mere convenience.
There is no reason to doubt the power of tribes to create within themselves agencies or
authorities for the separate regulation and development of specified resources, each with
corporate status of its own, as do the states. Tribes should therefore avoid the use of
state incorporation for tribal ventures, which subjects their activities to state jurisdiction
and laws.
123. 25 U.S.C. § 495 (1970) provides general authority to consolidate tribal resources.
See also Squire v. Capuemau, 351 U.S. 1 (1966) ; Stevens v. Commibsioner, 452 F.2d 741
(1971) which discuss this administrative policy.
124. See generally, HOUGH, supra note 1.
125. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971) (Indian Bill of Rights due
process and equal protection "not as broad".as the fourteenth amendment) ; cf Johnson v.
Lower Elwha Tribal Commissioner, ("some provisions" of the Indian Bill of Rights "may
have a modified meaning") ; McCardy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) ; Lohnes
v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1973). At the very least, equal protection must be rendered consistent with the limited membership of tribes, based upon race. Daly v. United
States, 483 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Garnett Wounded Head v. Ogalala Sioux
Tribe, F.2d(8th Cir. 1975) (conventional equal protection standards not applicable
to tribes).
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procedures be given deference, as are the procedures of states.126
There appears to be no reason why tribes should be deemed more
limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act than are the states by the
Bill of Rights, and it has never been held that due process requires
all of the states to have indentical procedures. Due process remains
a bundle of limits appropriate to the range of activities found among
the states. By extending that range, tribes may insist upon an extention of the limits.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the area of tribal ownership. As

noted above, tribal control makes consistently better economic sense
on reservations than among the states. Moreover, as a matter of federal law, the burden of demonstrating economic unreasonability is
17
upon the party challenging a state (or tribal) regulatory scheme. 2
There is authority for the proposition that government has greater powers to deal with its own property than to take or limit the use

of its citizens.ss Due process, narrowly construed, applies only When
private expectations have been altered by legislation. If property is
already public, then arguably no legitimate private expectations can
be disturbed irrespective of the use. A mere hope to win a public
franchise or privilege, for example to operate vessels on navigable

waters, does not suffice to warrant compensation for denial. On the
other hand, substantive and procedural due process must here be
clearly distinguished. Although the public owner may dispose of its
property to whom It will, the procedure for disposal presumably remains subject to attack as arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent with
express legislative goals and limitations .1 29 To the extent of their
ownership of resources, therefore, tribes should be immune from any
substantive due process challenge provided they reasonably distri126. Recent cases deferring to tribal constitutional requirements and tribal procedures
Include: Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1973) : Seneca Const. Rights Organ. v.
George, 348 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) ; Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb.
1971) ; Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F. Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971).
127. The State "is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or,
when it Is declared by the legislative arm, to override it." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537 (1934). Nebbla adopted the position taken by Brandeis in his dissent to New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), that only "arbitrary or discriminatory"
regulation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483.
488 (1955), the Court explained that "(t)he day is gone when this Court uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought." In this regard It Is significant that Brandeis,
In his dissent to IAebmann, supra, at 311 approved of experimental regulatory programs In
response to serious economic problems.
128. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330-340 (1936). The Court
described a general right of the United States pursuant to the property clause to protect
its possessions, and that "the Government has no less right to the energy thus available
by letting the water course over its turbines than it has to use the appropriate processes to
reduce to possession other property within Its control." Id. at 335-36. In other words,
ownership implies an absolute discretion over disposal. The Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1876) (dictum) argued that no one can acquire "property" for due process purposes In the use of public waters, easements, or other parts of the public domain, and that
any access to them is granted as a "franchise" or privilege only.
129. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

bute the proceeds to their members, directly and in the form of
services.
B.

FEDERAL

DUE

PROCESS

Let us assume that traditional review standards will be strictly
applied. A survey of federal cases indicates five general classes of
permissible justifications for state regulation: the preservation of public health and safety; 130 provision of public goods ("governmental
functions") such as transportation and communication; 13 1 control of
natural monopolies-industries such as railroads that can operate
at lowest cost when monopolized; 1 3 2 conservation of natural resources; 13 3 and correcting an inadequate supply of necessary goods (distributive equality) .14 This last justification requires some elaboration. It has been invoked in support of a wide range of public activities ranging all the way from public ownership'3 5 to price-supports1 36 and the use of certificates of public convenience and necessity to compel geographic dispersal of firms. 13 7 Proposed goals for
tribal enterprises, as well as the means, fall within these guidelines.
The presumption of reasonability excuses the tribe from rigorously
identifying what it regards as legitimate ends and means in the particular case; any or all may be involved to a greater or lesser degree.13 8 In dealing with public control by the United States, the Supreme Court has even disregarded the explicit justification for a project so long as some legitimate purpose could be advanced retrospectively. 139
130. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
131. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See also Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke
Housing Auth., 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939) (urban renewal) ; Port Authority of
St. Paul v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N.W.2d 560 (1966); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191,

199 N.E.2d 834 (1964).
132. The Court in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)

admitted the

validity of this theory but denied that the industry regulated in that case was in fact a
natural monopoly. Exemption of railroads and trucking from the antitrust laws has long
been justified on this theory. States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290
(1897); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). Compare Stephenson
v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931). See also Hertz
Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948).
133. Referred to in dictum by the Court in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
(1932).

134.
(1929)

Here the record is the most impressive, e.g., Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515
(cotton gins) ; Head v. Amostery Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885)

(grist mills) ; Chick-

ash Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Gin Co., 40 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1930)
State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102, 29 A. 947 (1893)

135.

E.g.,

(cotton gins)

(grist mills).

Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln,

275 U.S. 504 (1927)

Green v. Frazier,

253 U.S. 233 (1920); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917)
Toebe v. City of
Munising, 282 Mich. 1, 275 N.W. 744 (1937). Lincoln, Portland, and Munising deal with

fuel. Many States impose narrower limits on public ownership. See, e.g., Borgelt v. City of
Minneapolis, 271 Minn. 249, 135 N.W.2d 438 (1965) (city asphalt plant lawful so long as
limited to use of asphalt for city streets and no available private sources); John Wright
& Assoc. v. City of Red Wing, 254 Minn. 1, 93 N.W.2d 660 (1958) (municipal movie theatre
although operated at cost not a constitutional application of tax revenue).
136. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
137. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
138. See note 122 supra.
139. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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Even if the purpose is public, some cases in state courts have
demanded a showing that private financing could not accomplish the
objectives of a challenged exercise of taxation, borrowing, or eminent domain. 1 40 This is essentially an objective economic calculation. Albeit the immediate objective of tribal ownership is profitable
resource development, the ultimate employment of the revenue will
be for public goods: infrastructure and services. 141 Public goods ordinarily require public financing. Furthermore, elimination of the
federal review process is necessary to bring the cost of commercial
credit on reservations into line with credit costs elsewhere. This being the case, we predict that financing any activity on reservations,
at least for the present, will require public (federal and tribal) funding. If tribal tax bases are too thin to support public goods, tribes
will have to become entrepreneurs themselves to raise the needed
funds.
The private financing rule is a special case of the more general
theory that the use of public power in business is an inevitable temptation to favoritism and private windfalls. Many courts have held
that an incidental private benefit is tolerable, provided the principal benefit is public. 4 2 But neither the special nor the general rule
is properly applicable to tribal ownership. Both contemplate regulatory activities, not ownership and control. The danger exists when
private property-whether discrete goods such as land or taxes-is
channeled into different, private hands, and not for ultimate consumption but for re-investment and profit. Whether or not the taking is general, the application is individual or limited to a few. In
theory even a subsidy to the few has some public benefit, because
it will recirculate to others in the process of reinvestment. The point
is, therefore, that a disproportionate share of the subsidy will remain in a few hands. That is a forbidden price to pay for redistribution.
Public ownership necessarily rebuts the private windfall argu140. A review of the cases on public financing are found in Mitchell v. North Carolina
Indus. Dev. Finance Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968); Carruthers v. Port of
Astoria, 249 Ore. 324. 438 P.2d 725 (Ore. 1968). On eminent domain see, e.g., City &
County of San Francisco v. Ross, 270 P.2d 488 (Cal. App. 1954).
141. OI. Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931). The city was
challenged for applying tax revenues to an advertising campaign aimed at attracting industry. The Court prohibited any further use of revenue "to the end that the proprietary
activities of the city may be increased." We do not perceive any distinction between im-

mediate expenditures of revenue on services, and reinvestment in sources of even
greater revenue. The authority of government to invest tax revenue in incomegenerating securities pending disposition seems never to have been questioned. The only
difference in Jacksonville was that the return on the tax investment was to be indirecta larger future tax base-and future. Tribal ownership altogether eliminates any private
gain to capitalists on revenue re-investment, but does involve speculating current public
funds on future gains. Cf. cases cited in note 131 supra.
142. E.g., Reingold v. Harper, 6 N.J. 182, 78 A.2d 54 (1951) ; In re Legislative Route
62214 Section 1-A, 425 Pa. 349, 229 A.2d 1 (1967) ; Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth.,
422 Pa, 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966); Hertz Driveurself Stations v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58
A.2d 464 (1948).
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ment. The revenue generated by individual takings and tax funds
is entirely devoted to general purposes. No private party controls
its ultimate disposition. Moreover, the tribal resource base being
largely public to begin with, on the whole no private party is specially burdened.
The problem arises to the extent that tribes hope to consolidate
their resource bases, reacquiring interests allotted individually to tribal members or sold in fee to non-Indians. Tribes have three options.
They can purchase land outright (or exchange it for tribal land,
which is the same), take it outright by eminent domain, or acquire
it on a purchase, leaseback arrangement. Purchase is often simply
too costly. Eminent domain, while a power of many tribes pursuant
to their constitutions, raises inevitable due process and compensation problems. There would be little question of public use where
individual tracts are taken for public industry, since the community,
as well as the condemnee in most instances, will share in the ultimate revenue of the project. But compensation cannot be avoided.
The only advantage of eminent domain here as elsewhere, is that
the public can avoid hold-outs and to some degree set its own price
in its courts or legislature.
The reasonable price of reservation resources alone may actually be quite low. Due to fragmentation of ownership, allotments
are often too small to be profitably exploited for resources and too
numerous to be worthwhile accumulating by private industry. If the
surface is of greater value to the allottees, then a purchase, leaseback program is a comparably low-cost technique, since only the
resource interest is taken.1 4
Large fee tracts have been accumulated on some reservations
by non-Indians-large enough to render their resources profitable
without further consolidation. In these cases the cost of acquiring
the resources may exceed the benefits of complete control, especially if the tribe legislates to control externalities and apportion all fugaceous resources between itself and the private owners. Presumably
it cannot regulate so as to give its own public firm a special advantage, say, price-fixing or unequal access to transportation facilities,
but can enjoy any advantages due to scale and other efficiencies.
Private development could be taxed. A tribal tax on private development that exacted a like burden, dollar for dollar of gross revenue, for the support of public services would probably be lawful but
143. See note 57 supra. The appropriate consolidation technique varies considerably due
to local allotment histories. Some tribes, such as B3lackfeet and Crow, reserved some or all
of their resources pursuant to individualized allotment acts, and need only condemn the
surface. Others are virtually completely allotted both as to surface and subsurface. Although some allotment acts made it unlawful for non-Indians to acquire large fee tracts
on reservations, e.g., Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 751, they may be unenforceable
as untimely. Dillon v. Antler Land Co., 341 F. Supp. 784 (). Mont. 1972).
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almost certainly too heavy a burden for most private businesses to
bear.'"
C.

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LIMITATIONS

Tribal ownership and control of resources does not require territorial monopoly. However, exclusion problems and externalities in
resource exploitation combine to make the industry potentially more
efficient the more completely it controls the resource. Consequently
tribes are likely to benefit economically by consolidating under a
single public management all resources within their jurisdictionas the Bureau does now.
All regulation has a tendency to advance monopoly. Limitations
on entry-the requirement of certification-reduce the number of
competing firms and make it cheaper and easier for them to cartelize. Sometimes this is the object of regulation, as in fixed-network
industries (railroads, telephones, power transmission) where articulation of all of the competitors' services into a single system improves
the value of the industry.'45 In other instances cartelization is a byproduct of some other regulatory purpose. Using limitations on entry to disperse services geographically results in reducing or eliminating competition locally in areas already serviced. Price-fixing
(rate regulation) then becomes a necessary added feature of the regulatory scheme, in order to prevent the enjoyment of monopoly pro1
fits by the regulated firms.

6

Public ownership does not endanger the citizens of the public owner, because of their participation in the management process. It
does, however, raise interesting interstate problems. One jurisdiction, by manipulating the prices charged by its public monopoly,
could destructively compete with private enterprise in other jurisdictions, using the financial power of its governmental owner to absorb short-run losses. In its corporate capacity, the publicly-owned
firm could conceivably draw on public funds to enter into ownership
and control of businesses in other jurisdictions, becoming in effect
a true interstate monopoly.
The products of tribal resource industries will for the most part
be sold interstate, there being little demand for them on the reserva144. Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 289 U.S. 478 (1916); Wagner v. Leser, 239
U.S. 207 (1905).
145. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
146. Before the constitutionality of the New Deal regulatory programs has been generally
upheld, private price-fixing was widely regarded as per se invalid. Tyson & Brother United
Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1926) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of
Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1922). Following Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram
Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936), statutes such as the Fair Trade Laws authorizing
price-fixing agreements between merchants have been validated. However, these represent monopoly subsidies to Industry, and must be carefully distinguished from the general practice of controlling the rates of regulated industries.
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tion. Because of the relative size of reservations, they can be expectedl to have some impact on national prices, but not at the outset
anything like the "concentration" that triggers antitrust prosecution.

Some have advised tribes to actively engage in purchasing off-reservation realty. 147 Not only does this tempt the antitrust laws, but
it seems to exceed the territorial authority of the tribe. Outside of
its own territory, a tribal business agency loses its sovereign capacity and becomes an ordinary business, subject to state laws.14
So long as tribes do business in a relatively inefficient manner,
for example, by promoting the objective of distributive equity through
dis-economical expansions of the law force, we foresee few complaints from the state business lobbies. Tribal product prices will
remain relatively high, partially offsetting the extent to which they
increase national supply, and hence having little effect on private
competitors. But if tribes take advantage of the special efficiencies
of public control to undersell private producers on the national mar-

ket, they could capture private business' volume and bring prices
down. In economic terms, this would be a mutual blessing to tribes
and the ultimate consumers of natural resources. Could it nevertheless
be questioned as a use of government power to compete unfairly in interstate commerce? An effect on national prices is probably sufficient to satisfy jurisdiction for Clayton Act prosecution. 149 The ques-

tion must ultimately turn on whether the effect on price is due to
special privileges of government or simply to greater operating efficiency. Additionally, tribes may argue that the special federal statutory scheme recognizing and maintaining them supersedes the
antitrust laws in time and intent. 150 In the Indian Reorganization
147. HouoR, supra note 1, at 113-14, recommends what amounts to tribal colonization of
off-reservation lands.
148. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that off-reservation enterprises are not generally immune from state taxation as federal
instrumentalities. However, the Court conceded that the language and history of 25 U.S.C.
§ 465 (1970) indicate a special statutory property tax exemption for tribal trust holdings
wherever situated. Even if Mescalero frees off-reservation enclaves from the property tax
there is no suggestion that State regulatory jurisdiction is precluded by the trust status
of these lands. The Court was explicit that it granted this one exemption only in deference
to unavoidably direct language in the statute respecting taxation. Tribal enclaves must
therefore expect Income and use taxation, and unlimited State land-use regulation. State
law will presumably also determine the lawfulness of tribal ownership. It has been suggested to us that tribes argue that mere purchase of State lands pursuant to the statute
be deemed expansion of tribal sovereignty. That is precisely the outrageous pretension advanced by non-Indians since Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 542 (1823), to
pare away tribal jurisdiction: cession of sovereignty presumed from the same of public
domain. Actually, Chief Justice Marshall believed that a tribal sale without an acknowledged cession conveyed only a right to use subject to tribal law. Id. at 593. It is a strategic error at this time for tribes to concede, in order to gain control of off-reservation
lands, their best argument for asserting complete jurisdiction over fee lands within their
reservations.
149. We think this is a fair interpretation of United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs.
Ass'n, 386 U.S. 460, 464 (1949), cited approvingly in Gulf Oil Corp v. Copp. Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974).
150. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) ; United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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Act, Congress appears to have intended that authorized tribal business activity be free from general antitrust challenges.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Federal supervision of tribal economic development can be expected to prolong the relative poverty of Native American communities. More enlightened administration is not a satisfactory solution.
The nature and structure of federal supervision is inherently dis-economical. On the other hand, tribal ownership of natural resource
industries holds out some more meaningful promise of ability to
meet tribal economic and social goals. Although superficially a radical approach, tribal ownership is fairly within the confines of contemporary economic and legal principles. Owing to the current forecast of world supply and demand, tribal initiative in this area is
urgently needed.

